In this post I explained how the sanctity of life ethic behind the idea that human life and only human life is sacred from conception stems from the idea that ethics is about upholding God's property rights over all creation. I insisted that this was an abhorrent ethic, permitting people to be treated solely as property in a way rejected at the end of slavery.
However, that leaves us to develop a theory of ethics based on interests and centred around the idea that it is inherently wrong to violate these interests. Way back here I linked this with empathy, as empathy allows us to understand the importance of these interests and go about creating an ethic which does justice to them.
Creating this new ethic is a task which Peter Singer approaches with gusto, and I think he makes great strides. However, he is widely disliked and discredited for one very unpopular conclusion which he reaches. This is that it can be morally acceptable to kill some newborn babies. I will describe his reasoning and then attempt to explain why I think he goes wrong, building a more defensible ethic as I go along.
Singer's starting premise is that biological humanity is not in itself morally significant. I have said much independently to the same effect, so I will merely summarise the argument. On an interest-based approach, morally relevant faculties must have some relationship with these interests. So self-awareness, ability to feel pain etc can be morally relevant as they influence the interests that we have. However, there are no such faculties which tie to all and only biological humans. In the early stages, embryos have absolutely no interests, and while they gain more towards the end of pregnancy, they only gain certain crucial faculties after birth. Indeed, many animals have vastly superior faculties than newly born babies and some severely mentally disabled people.
Now, there is a lot of debate in ethics over what is necessary to meet the requirements to be a 'person,' and this is often treated as someone who must be treated ethically. It is usually drawn at the same place as to make 'persons' of those we can expect to be ethically responsible, and while I agree with this, there is no necessary reason why the line for moral agent and moral object should be the same. In any case, clearly going by faculties and interests we cannot draw the line so as to include all humans and exclude all animals. Hence the problem. Singer seems to embrace the same solution I favour: A graded scale of interests. Rather than personhood putting someone in or out of ethical consideration, we have to look at the level of perception and interests in order to decide how to treat someone. I hit upon a similar idea with appreciative empathy - treating others as we would like to be treated if we had their faculties and preferences. So Singer would agree without hesitation that it is wrong to torture animals, while there is no obligation to educate them - they do not have the faculties to appreciate the latter. Personhood can be seen as the top of the gradient, above which we can assume that 'people' have all the faculties we are used to, and so treat them as such.
The problem arises when it comes to killing (at least, where there is no pain involved). Singer considers the wrong of killing from a number of perspectives, and concludes that a right to life is far more persuasive when the being is self-aware or has a sense of existing over time. In this way its preferences can be thwarted. Preference utilitarianism therefore speaks in favour if it living. Clearly this does not apply to many animals, foetuses or (crucially) the new born. So what is wrong with killing these? Singer argues classical utilitarianism, so that to do so would overall decrease pleasure. This allows that if living a life is so unpleasant as to bring negative pleasure, then there is no obligation to maintain that life - the argument for euthanasia in a nutshell.
But Singer says that even where a non-person's life is worth living, it can still be okay to end it. In the case of new born babies, they are not yet people and so if unwanted, can justifiably be killed. However, for the most part this is not true as there are many people willing to adopt. For disabled babies, however, he worries that their lives will not be happy. Crucially, he argues that we can compare their happiness to that of babies who will be born if the disabled babies are killed, as replacements for them. It is here that I think he goes horribly wrong, and I think the reason is his commitment to utilitarianism.
Classical utilitarianism considers the total resulting pleasure from any choice in order to decide what is right. While maintaining that interests are the basis of morality, I still assert that this is overly simplistic and wrong-headed. To take a simplistic example, even if a gang rape will lead to greater pleasure for the perpetrators than pain for the victim, it is still wrong. The current case is another example. I think that while we can consider the total pleasure / pain of an individual (which will almost always still be positive), it is wrongheaded to simplistically compare it to that of others. Moreover, I think Singer is wrong to believe that we can even consider the interests of a being which may not be conceived.
Instead, I would argue that the better view is one where interests are violated wherever the capacity for them is lost. In killing any conscious being, we are robbing it of its faculties, and so violating its interests. This is more wrong the more developed these faculties are, but it is wrong (barring justifications) with any conscious being. This actually solves the old problem of what is wrong with killing a person in their sleep. It is not just that their preferences have been thwarted, but that their faculties have been destroyed. Their memories, plans, preferences and personality have been ended, and that is the great wrong of killing.
This actually allows a lot of other issues to slot into place. Abortion is still acceptable because even once the foetus has become conscious, its interests do not trump the dignity and autonomy of the mother, as explained here. It is wrong to kill the severely mentally disabled and new borns, because although not conscious, killing them would still rob them of those faculties they do have. At the same time, it is also wrong to kill animals because it robs them of their faculties, again unless there was a justification.
So once the baby is born and its interests are no longer competing with those of a pregnant woman, as long is its life is not so unpleasant that death would be a welcome release, and barring other justification, I do not think that we can allow it to be killed. We cannot compare it to babies who might be born otherwise, as they have no interests to lose. Although it is not yet a person by most people's standards, it still has interests which must be respected.
Showing posts with label Animal Rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Animal Rights. Show all posts
Sunday, July 16, 2006
Monday, March 20, 2006
Animal Rights - Practicality
The last post was an attempt to explain why animals should be treated with empathy in their own right, rather than just in order to appease humans. Now it is necessary for me to explain how to apply this without ridiculous results. Clearly, we cannot give to all living things the rights we give to humans. We cannot have them vote in our elections, as they have not the means to understand the consequences. Similarly, the right to an education (at least in the human sense) would be wasted on them. Furthermore, do we give rights to plants? As they are living too then we need to explain if and why they are distinguished from animals in what rights we give to them.
The answer lies in the fact that as always the better empathy to apply is appreciative empathy. Remember, this means that rather than treating other beings as if they were you, you should treat them as you would want to be treated if you were as them. So the question is what would they not like to have done to them? Now, sadly we can only experience being human, so it is impossible to know exactly. Some have taken this to mean that we cannot say that any of them experience pain and suffering, and so we cannot seriously contemplate animal rights. However, I say this is misguided. We cannot know that anyone other than ourselves really experiences pain and suffering. The whole point of empathy is to impute our understanding of positive and negative to others in order to do good to them. Our brains are wired up to recognise pleasure and pain in others, and to an extent in animals. We should use this, and all scientific methods available, to save animals from unnecessary pain and degradation.
So far this is pretty obvious to any who care about the rights of animals. Of course we should help them to avoid unnecessary pain and suffering. However, the next step is more difficult for many to take: What about death? There are a great many who will quite certainly say that animals must not be unduly distressed, but then accept mass slaughter of them, especially when it comes to food for humans. Often this is because they are so used to eating meat that the idea that it is wrong seems ridiculous. However, many of the arguments used to justify the practice would be seen for their weakness in other areas, and it is only here that they are allowed a sense of reasonableness (remember, I am only dealing here with people who do in fact accept that animals should have rights).
The best and most widely used of these is that it is natural for humans to eat meat. The argument from nature is bizarre in that it is used so selectively, for so few purposes, and yet many people give it much weight when it is. It is respected by many when used against homosexuality (ignoring the many examples of it in nature) and in favour of meat eating. But what if we were to accept this argument in a principled way? What is and is not in our nature? Evolution gave us what was necessary to survive, and especially for men this left strong desires for sex and violence. In many ways those are basic to our nature. The nature of men is arguably promiscuity, and yet we do not place any virtue on this. The same applies to violent conflict, even if we see it as necessary on occasion. Almost no-one truly believes that ethics should be determined by our nature and impulses. If it was then any kind of society or consideration for others beyond self-interest would be frowned upon. Clearly nature is not enough to found any kind of argument for eating meat.
A more sophisticated argument is necessity. The argument goes that unlike random torture of animals for pleasure, killing them for food fulfils a basic human need - sustinence. Now clearly the literal truth of this cannot really be argued any more. Vegetarians can live perfectly healthy lifestyles. What the argument has devolved to is one of convenience. It may well be more convenient to eat meat rather than living as a vegetarian, but since when has this ever determined ethics? It would seem incredible if convenience could be used to subvert ethical considerations. To use an example from within the question of animals, it will often be more convenient (which means more cost effective) to keep chickens locked up and force fed food rather than allowed to roam free when it comes to getting eggs. Does this allow us to ignore the ethical considerations of poorly treating these chickens. Again, if one does not believe animals have any rights, contrary to my previous post, then this will not persuade. But if, like myself and I believe a majority, you believe they do then this argument from convenience cannot be allowed to stand. (Similarly the Christian idea of human dominion over animals may prevent abuse of them which damages their worth to humans but cannot condemn and may indeed positively encourage cruelty in situations like here where it reduces the resources used up.)
A true argument for necessity may however be launched in favour of animal testing for medical research. This requires careful consideration. In essence the argument is that even though animals have these rights, they are prima facie or utilitarian (on the balance of goods) only and so can be overridden where necessity (ie. respect for human life) dictates. This suffers the problems of simplistic utilitarianism and if it were applied to humans the problems would be incredibly clear. If the rights to freedom from torture and death are only prima facie, to be overridden in order to prevent a greater volume of torture and death, then it would be morally justifiable to do testing not on animals but on human prisoners, especially since they would be more effective that way. The fact that such human experimentation appears abhorrent lends support to my view that empathy makes such rights definite, not utilitarian. (To clarify, I am not saying they could not necessarily be overridden in certain circumstances like killing for self-defence. Indeed my second abortion post argued that even if a foetus is a human life, respect for the dignity of the mother can override its right to life. However, I am saying that it can never be reason enough merely to say that it helps more people if we violate this right.)
So a number of possibilities can be identified. No rights for humans or animals has been rejected out of hand. Rights for humans but not for animals was dealt with in the previous pose. Definite rights for both is my argument. Utilitarian rights for both would appear abhorrent (on the human side) to empathy and most thinking. Therefore supporters of animal testing would have to support definite rights for humans, but only utilitarian rights for animals. However, this distinction is arbitrary. A very good reason would have to be found to give an entirely different type of right to the two groups, and the reasons given have fallen very short.
The clearest problem with most of the suggestions for morally distinguishing humans and animals is that they are ignored when applied to humans. Appeals that animals are stupider or not self-aware or cannot themselves empathise do not account for humans who are stupid, not self-aware or unable to empathise. No one would suggest that their rights should be considered lesser because of this. In essence it is not the type of mind but the body, the shell surrounding it, which determines whether such people think these rights should be surperior or inferior. There is clearly no principled reason for this. Appreciative empathy only varies depending on what would be appreciated by the object of the empathy. It does not punish them for lacking empathy themselves. Unless we are to abandon the norms of ethics and resort to the law of the jungle, they must apply to those who will not apply them back to us. Otherwise they are not ethical principles at all, only self-interested and cynical pacts.
So what are we left with? Once one accepts that animals deserve some rights, it seems impossible to identify a reason to deny them the same rights as humans (subject to the appreciative empathy filter of only rights which they will appreciate) which could not apply to some humans. Unless we radically devalue the protections rights give to humans, convenience and even necessity in the utilitarian sense cannot justify their torture and death.
There is one final, somewhat bizarre argument which seems to underlie many arguments of those who eat meat while arguing that animals should not be treated cruelly. This is that killing them is okay as long as it is painless. They are not suffering, so it is not wrong (this is often annexed to the convenience argument to tip the scales in favour of allowing it). This goes right to the heart of the question of what is wrong with murder. Of course, none of these people would suggest that murder of humans is okay as long as painless and without causing fear. Instead they would suggest that somehow the wrong of killing is limited to humans. Again, this distinction makes no sense. Why is painlessly killing a human sleeping soundly in her bed wrong? The reason which appeals to me most is that you rob them of something: Their awareness, their mind, their memories and experience. This of course applies equally to animals. Any distinction will again be one which could apply to any human and is not morally significant in any normal scenario. Equally the rationale that one violates the person's autonomy applies equally well to animals. Whatever reason is used for the distinction, there is no reason that killing can be excused just because it is painless.
It has been argued in this post that once it is accepted that animals are worthy of rights so, as the last post argued, they should be treated well for their own sakes rather than for the benefit of people, they must be accorded the same rights as humans as far as they can appreciate them. The distinctions offered to support eating meat and animal testing are unprincipled and illogical. Hopefully this will help those who do not understand my vegetarianism, and perhaps persuade others to consider the issues for themselves. If you cannot find a way, given what I have said, to justify these distinctions, please ask yourself this: How can conveniences like eating meat be worth violating the ethical standards we hold ourselves to in other areas? Do we actually have ethical standards? Or do we only have them until it is convenient to cast them aside? Goodnight all.
The answer lies in the fact that as always the better empathy to apply is appreciative empathy. Remember, this means that rather than treating other beings as if they were you, you should treat them as you would want to be treated if you were as them. So the question is what would they not like to have done to them? Now, sadly we can only experience being human, so it is impossible to know exactly. Some have taken this to mean that we cannot say that any of them experience pain and suffering, and so we cannot seriously contemplate animal rights. However, I say this is misguided. We cannot know that anyone other than ourselves really experiences pain and suffering. The whole point of empathy is to impute our understanding of positive and negative to others in order to do good to them. Our brains are wired up to recognise pleasure and pain in others, and to an extent in animals. We should use this, and all scientific methods available, to save animals from unnecessary pain and degradation.
So far this is pretty obvious to any who care about the rights of animals. Of course we should help them to avoid unnecessary pain and suffering. However, the next step is more difficult for many to take: What about death? There are a great many who will quite certainly say that animals must not be unduly distressed, but then accept mass slaughter of them, especially when it comes to food for humans. Often this is because they are so used to eating meat that the idea that it is wrong seems ridiculous. However, many of the arguments used to justify the practice would be seen for their weakness in other areas, and it is only here that they are allowed a sense of reasonableness (remember, I am only dealing here with people who do in fact accept that animals should have rights).
The best and most widely used of these is that it is natural for humans to eat meat. The argument from nature is bizarre in that it is used so selectively, for so few purposes, and yet many people give it much weight when it is. It is respected by many when used against homosexuality (ignoring the many examples of it in nature) and in favour of meat eating. But what if we were to accept this argument in a principled way? What is and is not in our nature? Evolution gave us what was necessary to survive, and especially for men this left strong desires for sex and violence. In many ways those are basic to our nature. The nature of men is arguably promiscuity, and yet we do not place any virtue on this. The same applies to violent conflict, even if we see it as necessary on occasion. Almost no-one truly believes that ethics should be determined by our nature and impulses. If it was then any kind of society or consideration for others beyond self-interest would be frowned upon. Clearly nature is not enough to found any kind of argument for eating meat.
A more sophisticated argument is necessity. The argument goes that unlike random torture of animals for pleasure, killing them for food fulfils a basic human need - sustinence. Now clearly the literal truth of this cannot really be argued any more. Vegetarians can live perfectly healthy lifestyles. What the argument has devolved to is one of convenience. It may well be more convenient to eat meat rather than living as a vegetarian, but since when has this ever determined ethics? It would seem incredible if convenience could be used to subvert ethical considerations. To use an example from within the question of animals, it will often be more convenient (which means more cost effective) to keep chickens locked up and force fed food rather than allowed to roam free when it comes to getting eggs. Does this allow us to ignore the ethical considerations of poorly treating these chickens. Again, if one does not believe animals have any rights, contrary to my previous post, then this will not persuade. But if, like myself and I believe a majority, you believe they do then this argument from convenience cannot be allowed to stand. (Similarly the Christian idea of human dominion over animals may prevent abuse of them which damages their worth to humans but cannot condemn and may indeed positively encourage cruelty in situations like here where it reduces the resources used up.)
A true argument for necessity may however be launched in favour of animal testing for medical research. This requires careful consideration. In essence the argument is that even though animals have these rights, they are prima facie or utilitarian (on the balance of goods) only and so can be overridden where necessity (ie. respect for human life) dictates. This suffers the problems of simplistic utilitarianism and if it were applied to humans the problems would be incredibly clear. If the rights to freedom from torture and death are only prima facie, to be overridden in order to prevent a greater volume of torture and death, then it would be morally justifiable to do testing not on animals but on human prisoners, especially since they would be more effective that way. The fact that such human experimentation appears abhorrent lends support to my view that empathy makes such rights definite, not utilitarian. (To clarify, I am not saying they could not necessarily be overridden in certain circumstances like killing for self-defence. Indeed my second abortion post argued that even if a foetus is a human life, respect for the dignity of the mother can override its right to life. However, I am saying that it can never be reason enough merely to say that it helps more people if we violate this right.)
So a number of possibilities can be identified. No rights for humans or animals has been rejected out of hand. Rights for humans but not for animals was dealt with in the previous pose. Definite rights for both is my argument. Utilitarian rights for both would appear abhorrent (on the human side) to empathy and most thinking. Therefore supporters of animal testing would have to support definite rights for humans, but only utilitarian rights for animals. However, this distinction is arbitrary. A very good reason would have to be found to give an entirely different type of right to the two groups, and the reasons given have fallen very short.
The clearest problem with most of the suggestions for morally distinguishing humans and animals is that they are ignored when applied to humans. Appeals that animals are stupider or not self-aware or cannot themselves empathise do not account for humans who are stupid, not self-aware or unable to empathise. No one would suggest that their rights should be considered lesser because of this. In essence it is not the type of mind but the body, the shell surrounding it, which determines whether such people think these rights should be surperior or inferior. There is clearly no principled reason for this. Appreciative empathy only varies depending on what would be appreciated by the object of the empathy. It does not punish them for lacking empathy themselves. Unless we are to abandon the norms of ethics and resort to the law of the jungle, they must apply to those who will not apply them back to us. Otherwise they are not ethical principles at all, only self-interested and cynical pacts.
So what are we left with? Once one accepts that animals deserve some rights, it seems impossible to identify a reason to deny them the same rights as humans (subject to the appreciative empathy filter of only rights which they will appreciate) which could not apply to some humans. Unless we radically devalue the protections rights give to humans, convenience and even necessity in the utilitarian sense cannot justify their torture and death.
There is one final, somewhat bizarre argument which seems to underlie many arguments of those who eat meat while arguing that animals should not be treated cruelly. This is that killing them is okay as long as it is painless. They are not suffering, so it is not wrong (this is often annexed to the convenience argument to tip the scales in favour of allowing it). This goes right to the heart of the question of what is wrong with murder. Of course, none of these people would suggest that murder of humans is okay as long as painless and without causing fear. Instead they would suggest that somehow the wrong of killing is limited to humans. Again, this distinction makes no sense. Why is painlessly killing a human sleeping soundly in her bed wrong? The reason which appeals to me most is that you rob them of something: Their awareness, their mind, their memories and experience. This of course applies equally to animals. Any distinction will again be one which could apply to any human and is not morally significant in any normal scenario. Equally the rationale that one violates the person's autonomy applies equally well to animals. Whatever reason is used for the distinction, there is no reason that killing can be excused just because it is painless.
It has been argued in this post that once it is accepted that animals are worthy of rights so, as the last post argued, they should be treated well for their own sakes rather than for the benefit of people, they must be accorded the same rights as humans as far as they can appreciate them. The distinctions offered to support eating meat and animal testing are unprincipled and illogical. Hopefully this will help those who do not understand my vegetarianism, and perhaps persuade others to consider the issues for themselves. If you cannot find a way, given what I have said, to justify these distinctions, please ask yourself this: How can conveniences like eating meat be worth violating the ethical standards we hold ourselves to in other areas? Do we actually have ethical standards? Or do we only have them until it is convenient to cast them aside? Goodnight all.
Thursday, December 15, 2005
Animal Rights - Justification
I have been a vegetarian for seven months now. The cravings for meat have mostly gone away now, and I feel happy to have gone with my conscience on this one. However, I still get baffled friends and relatives asking me why I would give up meat. I think it's time to properly explain, in the context of a general consideration of animal rights.
Animal rights have a bad reputation at the moment. Certain extremist proponents have come as close to domestic terrorism as we have seen in England in recent years. In my university city of Oxford, property belonging to my college has been burned down in the name of animal liberation. This has turned some people away from animal rights completely.
This is a completely illogical and irrational response, however. The methods by which an ideology is pushed do not affect the merits of the ideology itself (unless it encourages the methods of course). Can we look back at the civil rights movement in the USA and the advances for racial equality gained and disdain them because of the violence supported by those such as Malcolm X and the Black Panthers? Of course not. The ends do not justify the means (at least usually) but the means do not tarnish the goals.
Furthermore, and even more profoundly, the fact is that the subjects of the ideology (the animals) had nothing to do with the misbehaviour in their favour. While even in the above example one may say that those who commit terrible acts run the risk of damage to their cause, it is completely unfair to say the same where they are acting for the benefit of another group entirely. It is as ridiculous as disdaigning action against child cruelty because of misbehaviour by organisations opposing child cruelty. Opposing and disdaigning the organisation is rational and principled - doing the same to the cause is neither.
But now to more weighty considerations. To what extent should we protect animal rights? The beginning point as usual, is here empathy. The question is whether and to what extent empathy should be extended to non-humans. Whether animal rights should exist at all is dealt with in this post, and to what extent they should exist in the next.
There is a point of view that empathy should be limited to humans entirely. We should consider animals merely in terms of their value and utility to humanity. By this logic a pet cat should not be tortured due to the distress caused to the owner. Presumably the action would be morally neutral if the cat were an unloved stray, or if its owner did not care for it at all.
While disagreeing with this view with a vehemence, it is possible for there to be a logical consistency to it. A lot of laws against cruelty to animals can in theory be reduced to sparing humans the knowledge that animals are suffering.
Justifying the separation of humans and animals is tricky, however. It can often be explained by a biological instinct to favour our own race over other races. However, explaining is not justifying. In morality, it is necessary to do more than merely explain a stance in order to justify its adoption. The biological instinct can also lead us to favour our family over outsiders, our country over other countries, and our race over other races. Faced with that, few would suggest that it justifies any moral stance.
It is argued by many religious people that God favours humanity. I have already outlined why I believe that God cannot be seen as the ultimate moral authority. If one accepts that animals are unworthy of empathy merely because God says so, without any justification for this, then one has surrendered one's own moral reasoning. In such a case trying to convince such a person of a different moral view is probably futile - the only block which can be challenged in the system is blind acceptance of what they believe God to say.
Outside of that narrow category, other justifications are given. The idea that God created animals for humanity has little bearing. As explained before, there is no reason why God has the authority to create or vary the worth of individuals. He could not make animals worth less than humans any more than he could make women worth less than men, or black men worth less than white men (although both have been so argued). There would have to be something inherent in animals to make them worth less.
Instead, the idea of objective worth is a human notion with no reality attached. No matter how many subjective valuations of worth are made, this never adds up to an objective valuation. Nothing, human, animal or inanimate, is objectively worth anything.
In my Empathy post I explained why empathy was a good basis for a moral system. It does not require objective worth in order for this to work. However, many of the reasons for it boil down to empathy being instinctually good, and benefitting ourselves in the long run. It is possible to restrict it to humanity without destroying the basis upon which our faith in empathy is built. On the other hand, it is (or at least was) possible to restrict it to our own race in such a manner, and yet most good people today refuse to do so. I refuse to do so too, and I refuse to restrict it to humanity. I do so for what can be thought of as the following reason:
Empathy is about helping those you could have been. You could have been born otherwise, and your empathy helps those who are not you. Empathy ensures that had you in fact been born otherwise, you would have benefitted from this.
This is not a justification for empathy, but the rationale that I believe is supported by the partial justifications. It explains the empathetic impulse, it is intellectually coherent and it gives a self-interest slant to altruism. It is the most enlightened self-interest there can be.
With that in mind, we can explain why empathy should equally apply to other races. It also extends far beyond our species, to any living thing. In the next post I will consider how it should be applied in such a way, to such a diverse range of objects, without losing any of its coherence.
Animal rights have a bad reputation at the moment. Certain extremist proponents have come as close to domestic terrorism as we have seen in England in recent years. In my university city of Oxford, property belonging to my college has been burned down in the name of animal liberation. This has turned some people away from animal rights completely.
This is a completely illogical and irrational response, however. The methods by which an ideology is pushed do not affect the merits of the ideology itself (unless it encourages the methods of course). Can we look back at the civil rights movement in the USA and the advances for racial equality gained and disdain them because of the violence supported by those such as Malcolm X and the Black Panthers? Of course not. The ends do not justify the means (at least usually) but the means do not tarnish the goals.
Furthermore, and even more profoundly, the fact is that the subjects of the ideology (the animals) had nothing to do with the misbehaviour in their favour. While even in the above example one may say that those who commit terrible acts run the risk of damage to their cause, it is completely unfair to say the same where they are acting for the benefit of another group entirely. It is as ridiculous as disdaigning action against child cruelty because of misbehaviour by organisations opposing child cruelty. Opposing and disdaigning the organisation is rational and principled - doing the same to the cause is neither.
But now to more weighty considerations. To what extent should we protect animal rights? The beginning point as usual, is here empathy. The question is whether and to what extent empathy should be extended to non-humans. Whether animal rights should exist at all is dealt with in this post, and to what extent they should exist in the next.
There is a point of view that empathy should be limited to humans entirely. We should consider animals merely in terms of their value and utility to humanity. By this logic a pet cat should not be tortured due to the distress caused to the owner. Presumably the action would be morally neutral if the cat were an unloved stray, or if its owner did not care for it at all.
While disagreeing with this view with a vehemence, it is possible for there to be a logical consistency to it. A lot of laws against cruelty to animals can in theory be reduced to sparing humans the knowledge that animals are suffering.
Justifying the separation of humans and animals is tricky, however. It can often be explained by a biological instinct to favour our own race over other races. However, explaining is not justifying. In morality, it is necessary to do more than merely explain a stance in order to justify its adoption. The biological instinct can also lead us to favour our family over outsiders, our country over other countries, and our race over other races. Faced with that, few would suggest that it justifies any moral stance.
It is argued by many religious people that God favours humanity. I have already outlined why I believe that God cannot be seen as the ultimate moral authority. If one accepts that animals are unworthy of empathy merely because God says so, without any justification for this, then one has surrendered one's own moral reasoning. In such a case trying to convince such a person of a different moral view is probably futile - the only block which can be challenged in the system is blind acceptance of what they believe God to say.
Outside of that narrow category, other justifications are given. The idea that God created animals for humanity has little bearing. As explained before, there is no reason why God has the authority to create or vary the worth of individuals. He could not make animals worth less than humans any more than he could make women worth less than men, or black men worth less than white men (although both have been so argued). There would have to be something inherent in animals to make them worth less.
Instead, the idea of objective worth is a human notion with no reality attached. No matter how many subjective valuations of worth are made, this never adds up to an objective valuation. Nothing, human, animal or inanimate, is objectively worth anything.
In my Empathy post I explained why empathy was a good basis for a moral system. It does not require objective worth in order for this to work. However, many of the reasons for it boil down to empathy being instinctually good, and benefitting ourselves in the long run. It is possible to restrict it to humanity without destroying the basis upon which our faith in empathy is built. On the other hand, it is (or at least was) possible to restrict it to our own race in such a manner, and yet most good people today refuse to do so. I refuse to do so too, and I refuse to restrict it to humanity. I do so for what can be thought of as the following reason:
Empathy is about helping those you could have been. You could have been born otherwise, and your empathy helps those who are not you. Empathy ensures that had you in fact been born otherwise, you would have benefitted from this.
This is not a justification for empathy, but the rationale that I believe is supported by the partial justifications. It explains the empathetic impulse, it is intellectually coherent and it gives a self-interest slant to altruism. It is the most enlightened self-interest there can be.
With that in mind, we can explain why empathy should equally apply to other races. It also extends far beyond our species, to any living thing. In the next post I will consider how it should be applied in such a way, to such a diverse range of objects, without losing any of its coherence.
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