This will be my first post in response to what I have read of Peter Singer's work. I was not expecting to agree with all of his work, despite him being in broadly the same camp as me in terms of ethical views (pro-choice, anti-animal testing etc). I'm glad that reading a volume summarising his main views, (Writings On An Ethical Life, Peter Singer, 2002 Fourth Estate), has allowed me to find some major points of disagreement, while understanding and respecting his main points.
In this first post however, I will be agreeing with and developing upon one of his points. This is his identification and rejection of the monolithic 'old ethic' which is creaking with the weight of its illogic and incompatibility with modern realities. He calls this the 'sanctity of life' ethic, which holds human life inviolable and intensely superior to animal life. As well as justifying any harm to animals in the name of human wellbeing, it denies that there is ever a reason to end human life unless in the name of saving other human life. Thus suicide and euthanasia are always wrong, as is abortion from the point of conception.
There is much to be said about what is wrong with this, and Singer does so admirably. The specialness of humanity is not premised upon any faculties or abilities peculiar to humans, as otherwise it could not be extended to the seconds after conception or the most profoundly mentally disabled. Furthermore, removing the right to choose to end our lives and refusing to accept that other harms (like extreme ongoing pain or discomfort) can make it worth our while to have our lives ended makes living less a right and more an obligation. What Singer does not identify, I think, is the rationale behind this. Stripped down, I think that it exists in quite startling form. This explanation is purely religious, although it has been unthinkingly adopted even by the nonreligious for a long time.
This explanation for the old ethic is this. Normal 'interests' (to live, to be free from pain, to have dignity, etc) are not what are to be respected. If they were, then it would be impossible to include all that are included and exclude all that are not. Instead, the specialness of humanity is based on the value placed on it by God. What this means is that what is wrong about killing someone is that it offends God's value on the person's life. Moral wrongs are not against people so much as against God. Thus even if a baby and a chimpanzee had exactly the same mental development and state, harming the latter would be far worse because it would be more of a slight to God. This actually rings of familiarity with another institution we are used to. Property. The ethic treats all things purely as the property of God. We would not complain about our property's rights being violated when it is stolen or damaged. We would complain about our rights over the property. The property's value is entirely wound up in those with interests in it. This seems to be exactly what the old ethic does with people, considering them as God's property.
Thus it is worse to harm humans because God places more value on humans. Just as we would be willing to sacrifice less beloved property for more beloved, God is willing to allow animals to be sacrificed for humans. These preferences need not be rational - indeed, as both Singer and I have tried to show, there is no rational divider which neatly puts all humans on one side and all non-humans on the other. It would seem worse to us to damage property that is valuable to someone than property which they care little for, even though the valuation may be irrational to us. This is because it is the owner we care about, not the property. The sanctity of life ethic treats us like property.
For more evidence, a key teaching from Christianity should help. This is the view, inherent in the sanctity of life ethic, that only God may give or take life. This was once used as an argument against medicine (and still is in some fringe groups) and while it is now generally thought that things which kill us are generally evil rather than God's will, the second part of the dictum is widely held to still be true. We may not take life, because that is God's job. God has the right to rob us of our lives. This is entirely consistent with God owning us. A key example is the story of Abraham and Isaac in the Old Testament. Abraham is routinely praised for obeying God in attempting to kill his own son. The action was right, because God said it to be so. This takes precedence over any supposed 'rights' we have. This is because we are God's to do with as He wishes. The general rules of morality are only there because He put them there, because that is how He wants His property treated. Just as how we may allow our property to be destroyed, so may God. Our interests do not come into it.
As an ethic, this posits a radically different understanding of morality from any most of us would recognise. It is no longer about interests and rights, but about God's plans for His playthings. As an explanation for why God's commands make up morality, it still suffers from the same failings as other explanations, as previously considered on this blog, but it also seems most repugnant. If God were to favour one human over another, would the lowlier be morally required to give his life and interests for the other? How is our position any different to that of slaves (who were even recognised as property), albeit with a possibly benign owner?
It is difficult to put into words just how wrong this way of looking at people seems to be. At least it is consistent, but even the most consistent ethics can be wicked. Far from all Christians or religious people would accept this basis, and they need not. God can be worshipped and respected without being owner. A counter-ethic must be advanced which puts the interests of living beings at the centre. This is an ethic towards which I strive, and Peter Singer does exactly the same. I may not agree with him in many ways, but in the search for this alternative, I concur wholeheartedly.
Wednesday, July 12, 2006
Friday, June 16, 2006
God and Authority
In this post I would like to point out two problems with the idea that God created morality, going further than the arguments in my post about Relativism. These arguments will not necessarily work against the idea of morality from nature itself, although I have already dealt with some of the arguments from nature by basically arguing that if there are such standards, they are completely unknowable.
I will attempt to flesh out the following passage I wrote in the above post, and consider its implications for the idea of God making morality:
"In the end, authority is a human concept. Furthermore, while clearly whatever posits universal standards requires authority to do so for legitimacy, authority itself is merely a status given to one which allows him or her certain rights to do things and creates obligations on others to do other things. Rights and obligations are in themselves creations of morality, so in the end there is a circularity to the concepts. Morality is only underpinned by morality, perhaps underpinned by the acceptance of the people. In the end therefore, morality is dependant on the understanding of the people, and that can only mean relativism."
The Authority Paradox
The crucial assumption to pick out of my argument here is that authority is a moral phenomenon. Interestingly enough, not everyone seems to believe this. The works of John Austin suggest that authority is in fact the power to enforce one's dictates. If we apply Austin's definition to God, we see something interesting. As long as we imagine God to exist and be roughly like He is presented in Christianity or similar traditions, He could have the power to enforce his dictates. Of course, for Austin possession of power is insufficient - willingness to use it was required. We can use the idea of Hell as explaining in what way God enforces his dictates. In this way, God could have authority. What this means though is that morality is no more than avoiding punishment. The only way to distinguish being moral from actions done to avoid the hangman's noose or the highwayman's gun is by the source of the obligation. In the case of morality, it would be God threatening punishment for non-compliance. If this is the meaning of authority and morality, then both are reduced to questions of power and avoiding punishment. Instead, it is submitted that any morality people demand that God creates is much richer and more important than this. It is supposed to create obligations in a way that normal threats do not.
Joseph Raz said that authority is a reason to act. He explained it in terms of authorities taking old reasons and assessing them to create a new reason which (if we accept the authority) excludes consideration of the old reasons. Again, this presents an interesting view if we consider the supposed authority of God to determine morality. Conceiving of God as weighing up moral arguments to create a uniform code is tempting, but it requires us to accept a background morality behind God. It gives no account of how God could create morality ex nihilo.
So the only way that God could have the authority to create morality without reducing the concept of morality to orders backed by threats is to conceive of authority as moral in nature. This seems to me to be what is generally meant by the term. When we say someone has authority, we mean that they have characteristics which make it good to accept their commands, or at least to take them into account. It is submitted that this is the only rational way to conceive of God's claim of authority to create morality. It must be that He has the moral characteristics to make it right for people to follow what He says.
The downfall of this should be obvious. If God's authority to create morality stems from moral characteristics He possesses, then the morality of these characteristics must come from elsewhere. God cannot bestow on himself the authority to do this, as he must have authority in order to create any moral truths, including authority. The authority to create morality including authority must come from elsewhere. If God is to have any role in morality, it cannot be as its sole creator. There must be some background source of his authority.
The Reason Paradox
There is another problem with the idea that God can set morality that has occurred to me and which revolves around authority, a tension in the idea that God’s moral standards are the only valid ones. If they are, then they take precedence over any human moral beliefs. If God were to instruct one to torture a child, they would have to do so even if they found this abhorrent. This means that as far as morality goes, human reason is inadequate and useless. We must follow God’s morality instead.
So far, so good. This is accepted by many Christians. The problem is that if this is true, then humans are clearly not qualified to place God as the centre of their moral worldview. If their reason is inadequate to decide morality, then it cannot be adequate to work out that God determines morality.
The response to this will clearly be that while reason is inadequate to work out morality from scratch, it is still adequate to figure out other, logical things, like God’s supremacy over morality. But this is flawed. As was explained above, authority is a moral concept. Picking a basis for a moral system is a value judgement, whether it is by deciding that God’s rules are worth following, or that some human value should be the basis. To say that God has the authority to dictate morals is as much a moral opinion as is saying that Bob has that authority. Therefore even if God objectively had the ultimate authority to dictate morality, we would not have the necessary moral reasoning skills to appreciate it. Anyone claiming God had moral authority would be guessing at best. Therefore a claim that God is the ultimate moral arbiter is ridiculous. (Note that again this argument does not apply if God is merely taken as describing a morality that exists independently of him.)
The only argument which could really seek to counter this is that humans are capable of moral reasoning, but that this should tell them that God is the ultimate moral arbiter, who should take precedence when His word conflicts with other aspects of that reasoning. This is a clever argument but fails in its application. Even if God would never overrule a moral rule that we submit to His higher moral judgement ('the moral precept'), acceptance that our reasoning must be subservient to that of another is acceptance that our reasoning is inadequate. It is logically inconsistent to hold the moral precept in higher stead than the rest of our carefully thought out moral logic. Doing so would not just be having God overrule out views, but having one particular among our views override the rest of our views. A moral system cannot consistently come to a conclusion like that. If it holds two inconsistent views then it must hold that it was mistaken in some way, not that it was right in both but that one takes precedence over the other as the precedence condition is itself a moral view inconsistent with the overridden view. God's authority over us must come from a moral judgement which is just as fallible as any of our others, so it makes no sense for it to overwhelm others.
The results of these paradoxes is that it makes no sense for God or any being to create morality, as they would need authority to do so, and this comes from a moral code. Even if this hurdle were somehow overcome there would still be no way for people to know that God is the ultimate creator of morality as the claim itself would if true nullify the ability of the claimant to accurately make such a claim. These paradoxes do not necessarily damage theistic beliefs or even the idea that God has a role in morality. However, I believe that they do considerable damage to the belief in God as the sole and complete author of morality.
I will attempt to flesh out the following passage I wrote in the above post, and consider its implications for the idea of God making morality:
"In the end, authority is a human concept. Furthermore, while clearly whatever posits universal standards requires authority to do so for legitimacy, authority itself is merely a status given to one which allows him or her certain rights to do things and creates obligations on others to do other things. Rights and obligations are in themselves creations of morality, so in the end there is a circularity to the concepts. Morality is only underpinned by morality, perhaps underpinned by the acceptance of the people. In the end therefore, morality is dependant on the understanding of the people, and that can only mean relativism."
The Authority Paradox
The crucial assumption to pick out of my argument here is that authority is a moral phenomenon. Interestingly enough, not everyone seems to believe this. The works of John Austin suggest that authority is in fact the power to enforce one's dictates. If we apply Austin's definition to God, we see something interesting. As long as we imagine God to exist and be roughly like He is presented in Christianity or similar traditions, He could have the power to enforce his dictates. Of course, for Austin possession of power is insufficient - willingness to use it was required. We can use the idea of Hell as explaining in what way God enforces his dictates. In this way, God could have authority. What this means though is that morality is no more than avoiding punishment. The only way to distinguish being moral from actions done to avoid the hangman's noose or the highwayman's gun is by the source of the obligation. In the case of morality, it would be God threatening punishment for non-compliance. If this is the meaning of authority and morality, then both are reduced to questions of power and avoiding punishment. Instead, it is submitted that any morality people demand that God creates is much richer and more important than this. It is supposed to create obligations in a way that normal threats do not.
Joseph Raz said that authority is a reason to act. He explained it in terms of authorities taking old reasons and assessing them to create a new reason which (if we accept the authority) excludes consideration of the old reasons. Again, this presents an interesting view if we consider the supposed authority of God to determine morality. Conceiving of God as weighing up moral arguments to create a uniform code is tempting, but it requires us to accept a background morality behind God. It gives no account of how God could create morality ex nihilo.
So the only way that God could have the authority to create morality without reducing the concept of morality to orders backed by threats is to conceive of authority as moral in nature. This seems to me to be what is generally meant by the term. When we say someone has authority, we mean that they have characteristics which make it good to accept their commands, or at least to take them into account. It is submitted that this is the only rational way to conceive of God's claim of authority to create morality. It must be that He has the moral characteristics to make it right for people to follow what He says.
The downfall of this should be obvious. If God's authority to create morality stems from moral characteristics He possesses, then the morality of these characteristics must come from elsewhere. God cannot bestow on himself the authority to do this, as he must have authority in order to create any moral truths, including authority. The authority to create morality including authority must come from elsewhere. If God is to have any role in morality, it cannot be as its sole creator. There must be some background source of his authority.
The Reason Paradox
There is another problem with the idea that God can set morality that has occurred to me and which revolves around authority, a tension in the idea that God’s moral standards are the only valid ones. If they are, then they take precedence over any human moral beliefs. If God were to instruct one to torture a child, they would have to do so even if they found this abhorrent. This means that as far as morality goes, human reason is inadequate and useless. We must follow God’s morality instead.
So far, so good. This is accepted by many Christians. The problem is that if this is true, then humans are clearly not qualified to place God as the centre of their moral worldview. If their reason is inadequate to decide morality, then it cannot be adequate to work out that God determines morality.
The response to this will clearly be that while reason is inadequate to work out morality from scratch, it is still adequate to figure out other, logical things, like God’s supremacy over morality. But this is flawed. As was explained above, authority is a moral concept. Picking a basis for a moral system is a value judgement, whether it is by deciding that God’s rules are worth following, or that some human value should be the basis. To say that God has the authority to dictate morals is as much a moral opinion as is saying that Bob has that authority. Therefore even if God objectively had the ultimate authority to dictate morality, we would not have the necessary moral reasoning skills to appreciate it. Anyone claiming God had moral authority would be guessing at best. Therefore a claim that God is the ultimate moral arbiter is ridiculous. (Note that again this argument does not apply if God is merely taken as describing a morality that exists independently of him.)
The only argument which could really seek to counter this is that humans are capable of moral reasoning, but that this should tell them that God is the ultimate moral arbiter, who should take precedence when His word conflicts with other aspects of that reasoning. This is a clever argument but fails in its application. Even if God would never overrule a moral rule that we submit to His higher moral judgement ('the moral precept'), acceptance that our reasoning must be subservient to that of another is acceptance that our reasoning is inadequate. It is logically inconsistent to hold the moral precept in higher stead than the rest of our carefully thought out moral logic. Doing so would not just be having God overrule out views, but having one particular among our views override the rest of our views. A moral system cannot consistently come to a conclusion like that. If it holds two inconsistent views then it must hold that it was mistaken in some way, not that it was right in both but that one takes precedence over the other as the precedence condition is itself a moral view inconsistent with the overridden view. God's authority over us must come from a moral judgement which is just as fallible as any of our others, so it makes no sense for it to overwhelm others.
The results of these paradoxes is that it makes no sense for God or any being to create morality, as they would need authority to do so, and this comes from a moral code. Even if this hurdle were somehow overcome there would still be no way for people to know that God is the ultimate creator of morality as the claim itself would if true nullify the ability of the claimant to accurately make such a claim. These paradoxes do not necessarily damage theistic beliefs or even the idea that God has a role in morality. However, I believe that they do considerable damage to the belief in God as the sole and complete author of morality.
Friday, June 09, 2006
The Purpose Of Ethics
This post will consider the purpose of ethics and ethical theory, and in it I hope to explain the importance of consistency in ethical theory. The reason for this is that there is a potential objection to all of the ethical suggestions here, and many from ethicists across the ages: Why should my ethical beliefs be logical? An explanation of this is needed if there is to be any way to communicate with such people. The theory that I espouse may be somewhat surprising, but I hope that it can also be seen as illuminating.
I shall distinguish two aspects of ethical systems: Intuitions and logic. The first is the intuitive ethical judgements that we all have independently of any rational examination or logical underpinning. Now I emphasise that I am really referring to principles rather than assumptions. If someone merely assumes that something or wrong or right, it is more likely that this assumption can be challenged and overturned. Instead, by intuitions I more mean principles which are very unlikely to be changed no matter what arguments are given. An example might well be that all other things being equal, we should not kill. No matter what arguments are given to most people, they are not going to change their minds and think that killing is fine. This does not mean that these principles must be absolute. There can be numerous exceptions to when killing will be wrong, but none of these attack the basic principle itself. The more intuition based a system is, the more of these basic beliefs are held as unassailable and, in general, the more dogmatic a belief system will therefore be.
The second is logical principles derived from intuitions. This will use analogy and juxtaposition in order to make sense of the intuitions of the system, forming them into a coherent whole. Consistency is crucial here, as logic requires significant distinctions between cases if we are to alter the conclusions we reach. While intuitions are very difficult to displace since they are not based on logic, logic itself is always subject to contrary argument and reconsideration. So the more logic-based a system is, the more consistency it is likely to have to unify the intuitions.
I think that the interaction between these two forces can explain how logical systems grow up. In developing new theories, there are some conclusions that if reached I would refuse to accept, like if they made murder morally necessary. On the other hand, my stances on more complicated issues like abortion are the product of careful ethical reasoning and so could theoretically be overturned by logical argument. It is submitted that it makes more sense to have simpler principles as intuitions, since this can allow a greater basis for logic to work to fill in the gaps. If abortion being wrong was the principle, it would be difficult to apply this to many other cases - is it wrong to kill, wrong to visit a doctor, wrong to make choices etc? Instead, how most people actually work is by using the principle that it is wrong to kill and building up to the logical decision that abortion is wrong. We can often whittle down our strongest held views to a few irreducible intuitions and it is submitted that this is healthy.
However, our imaginary adversary might argue that his ethical system consists entirely of intuitions, and that he feels no need to be consistent. If this is true, then we are stumped - how can we convince this person of anything? This position would seem difficult to attack, but it is submitted that there is a good reason not to adopt something like it. This reason, the reason that it is better to use logic to create a consistent ethical theory as far as possible, is that it better allows us to achieve one (if not both) of the dual purposes of ethics.
Here is where my examination becomes controversial. It is usually thought that ethics and an ethical system have only one purpose, which I will put like this: It helps us to flesh out what we believe to be right and wrong from our dearest held intuitions. This means whittling down what we believe to intuitions and, for most of us, using logical consistency to apply these to other cases. This interaction between intuition and logic helps us to create an ethical system. However, the intuitionist will say that they can create an intuitive ethical theory just as well. If this is true, then we must look to the second purpose.
This second goal of ethics and ethical theories is to persuade other people of our ethical conclusions. When we force ourselves to take our intuitions to their logical conclusions however uncomfortable, we do so in order to give the necessary rationality to our ethics to use them to challenge the ethical systems of others. We develop our ethical beliefs not only for our own sakes, but in order to convert others.
This needs to be considered further, because it has rather surprising implications. If we imagine a world where everyone used purely intuition-based ethical systems, then no-one would be able to change the mind of anyone else through logical argument. This might work perfectly well for some people, but for most people it would be infuriating having no way to persuade people that their system was more valid. While it is important to be true to our own ethical standards, an important aspect of this is the possibility that this could encourage other people to accept our standards for themselves. Thus it is that people are not content with keeping their ethical views entirely private. Ethical debates are not about trying to find some abstract truth, but encouraging others to accept our views.
The only way that there can be meaningful ethical debate and ethical conversion is through logic. Of course, a lot of personal ethics is not logical but intuitive. However, in order to give ourselves the ethical ammunition to attack others, we limit the number of absolute intuitions we accept and piece together the rest of our systems with logical extrapolations. It is a trade-off, because while we now have the ability to attack other ethical theories, we have laid our ethics open to criticism and attack by others. Purely intuition-based ethicists cut themselves off from this world of ethical debate, unable to influence or be influenced. This gives their ethics a much narrower purpose. They merely know what they think right, not why. Furthermore, this damages the possibility of ethical co-operation when it comes to political and social ends. The more basic intuitions people have, the less likely they are to coincide. Almost everyone can agree that suffering is wrong, but it is harder to agree on how to react to poverty, and even more so when our only source is our own gut reactions. By reducing the number of intuitions we use, we find ourselves more able to coincide with others either by sharing intuitions and coming to agreements on how to logically build on this, or using different intuitions to come to the same substantive results (see my post on Block Theory). In short, having a more logic-based ethical theory bestows on us a greater ability to co-operate and influence the views of others. In a society such as ours, that becomes crucial.
The result is that consistency, a crucial element of logic, becomes a prerequisite to any successful ethical theory, measured by these yard-sticks. Attempting to cling on to one's beliefs by avoiding ethical debate has a number of disadvantages which suggest that it is for the benefit of everyone that we instead open up our beliefs for logical consideration.
Let us consider a worked example. Fred believes that abortion is wrong. Originally his position is entirely intuitionistic, and that suits him just fine. However, over time this comes to frustrate him. He is unable to persuade anyone else of his view and so feels that he is failing to do as much for his cause (which he views as right and good) as he could. He also has no luck in pushing for legislation outlawing abortion because no-one has any reason to agree with his views. Finally, Fred decides that action is necessary. He examines his intuition that abortion is wrong and through consideration, converts it into a logical inference from a number of other intuitions, primary among them being that killing is wrong. He finds that the more he reduces his intuitions down to less controversial intuitions plus logic, the better able he is able to argue with other people and in favour of his legislation. Even though his base intuitions may not be in accord with others, he is able to build up to conclusions with which others agree and finally to try to convince them of his ultimate conclusion. He may win a few converts or, potentially, he may have his logic challenged by those on the other side. He has taken the risk of challenge with the benefit of the chance to challenge. The risk has been worth it to convert others.
One might argue, however, that Fred has only let logic enter his system in the case of abortion, and only there because he cares enough. Anyone who tries to talk to him about climate change would have their pleas fall on deaf ears. However, it is not so simple. Once Fred has acknowledged the value of logic and consistency, this demands that it spread out across all his views. One may use a logical analogy to abortion in order to convince him of another view. Moreover, if he refuses to logically examine his beliefs in other areas Fred can be accused of hypocrisy, damaging his stance on abortion. Furthermore if Fred also cares about what he believes to be right, the introduction of logic in one area is more likely to make his think that he should logically examine all his beliefs. In short, although everyone has different issues about which they are passionate, this is likely to lead to the necessity of a defensible, consistent ethical view in all issues, or at least any brought up.
So to the hypothetical antagonist who claims that their system is entirely intuitionistic, the answer is simple. They may take that position and run with it, but they will never be able to persuade anyone on any ethical issue unless they allow in some element of logic to their views, and once that happens the process may not so easily be halted. The more forward thinking and efficient course is to open up all our ethical views to logical consideration, whittling down our intuitions as far as possible, so that we can face opposing views head on.
I shall distinguish two aspects of ethical systems: Intuitions and logic. The first is the intuitive ethical judgements that we all have independently of any rational examination or logical underpinning. Now I emphasise that I am really referring to principles rather than assumptions. If someone merely assumes that something or wrong or right, it is more likely that this assumption can be challenged and overturned. Instead, by intuitions I more mean principles which are very unlikely to be changed no matter what arguments are given. An example might well be that all other things being equal, we should not kill. No matter what arguments are given to most people, they are not going to change their minds and think that killing is fine. This does not mean that these principles must be absolute. There can be numerous exceptions to when killing will be wrong, but none of these attack the basic principle itself. The more intuition based a system is, the more of these basic beliefs are held as unassailable and, in general, the more dogmatic a belief system will therefore be.
The second is logical principles derived from intuitions. This will use analogy and juxtaposition in order to make sense of the intuitions of the system, forming them into a coherent whole. Consistency is crucial here, as logic requires significant distinctions between cases if we are to alter the conclusions we reach. While intuitions are very difficult to displace since they are not based on logic, logic itself is always subject to contrary argument and reconsideration. So the more logic-based a system is, the more consistency it is likely to have to unify the intuitions.
I think that the interaction between these two forces can explain how logical systems grow up. In developing new theories, there are some conclusions that if reached I would refuse to accept, like if they made murder morally necessary. On the other hand, my stances on more complicated issues like abortion are the product of careful ethical reasoning and so could theoretically be overturned by logical argument. It is submitted that it makes more sense to have simpler principles as intuitions, since this can allow a greater basis for logic to work to fill in the gaps. If abortion being wrong was the principle, it would be difficult to apply this to many other cases - is it wrong to kill, wrong to visit a doctor, wrong to make choices etc? Instead, how most people actually work is by using the principle that it is wrong to kill and building up to the logical decision that abortion is wrong. We can often whittle down our strongest held views to a few irreducible intuitions and it is submitted that this is healthy.
However, our imaginary adversary might argue that his ethical system consists entirely of intuitions, and that he feels no need to be consistent. If this is true, then we are stumped - how can we convince this person of anything? This position would seem difficult to attack, but it is submitted that there is a good reason not to adopt something like it. This reason, the reason that it is better to use logic to create a consistent ethical theory as far as possible, is that it better allows us to achieve one (if not both) of the dual purposes of ethics.
Here is where my examination becomes controversial. It is usually thought that ethics and an ethical system have only one purpose, which I will put like this: It helps us to flesh out what we believe to be right and wrong from our dearest held intuitions. This means whittling down what we believe to intuitions and, for most of us, using logical consistency to apply these to other cases. This interaction between intuition and logic helps us to create an ethical system. However, the intuitionist will say that they can create an intuitive ethical theory just as well. If this is true, then we must look to the second purpose.
This second goal of ethics and ethical theories is to persuade other people of our ethical conclusions. When we force ourselves to take our intuitions to their logical conclusions however uncomfortable, we do so in order to give the necessary rationality to our ethics to use them to challenge the ethical systems of others. We develop our ethical beliefs not only for our own sakes, but in order to convert others.
This needs to be considered further, because it has rather surprising implications. If we imagine a world where everyone used purely intuition-based ethical systems, then no-one would be able to change the mind of anyone else through logical argument. This might work perfectly well for some people, but for most people it would be infuriating having no way to persuade people that their system was more valid. While it is important to be true to our own ethical standards, an important aspect of this is the possibility that this could encourage other people to accept our standards for themselves. Thus it is that people are not content with keeping their ethical views entirely private. Ethical debates are not about trying to find some abstract truth, but encouraging others to accept our views.
The only way that there can be meaningful ethical debate and ethical conversion is through logic. Of course, a lot of personal ethics is not logical but intuitive. However, in order to give ourselves the ethical ammunition to attack others, we limit the number of absolute intuitions we accept and piece together the rest of our systems with logical extrapolations. It is a trade-off, because while we now have the ability to attack other ethical theories, we have laid our ethics open to criticism and attack by others. Purely intuition-based ethicists cut themselves off from this world of ethical debate, unable to influence or be influenced. This gives their ethics a much narrower purpose. They merely know what they think right, not why. Furthermore, this damages the possibility of ethical co-operation when it comes to political and social ends. The more basic intuitions people have, the less likely they are to coincide. Almost everyone can agree that suffering is wrong, but it is harder to agree on how to react to poverty, and even more so when our only source is our own gut reactions. By reducing the number of intuitions we use, we find ourselves more able to coincide with others either by sharing intuitions and coming to agreements on how to logically build on this, or using different intuitions to come to the same substantive results (see my post on Block Theory). In short, having a more logic-based ethical theory bestows on us a greater ability to co-operate and influence the views of others. In a society such as ours, that becomes crucial.
The result is that consistency, a crucial element of logic, becomes a prerequisite to any successful ethical theory, measured by these yard-sticks. Attempting to cling on to one's beliefs by avoiding ethical debate has a number of disadvantages which suggest that it is for the benefit of everyone that we instead open up our beliefs for logical consideration.
Let us consider a worked example. Fred believes that abortion is wrong. Originally his position is entirely intuitionistic, and that suits him just fine. However, over time this comes to frustrate him. He is unable to persuade anyone else of his view and so feels that he is failing to do as much for his cause (which he views as right and good) as he could. He also has no luck in pushing for legislation outlawing abortion because no-one has any reason to agree with his views. Finally, Fred decides that action is necessary. He examines his intuition that abortion is wrong and through consideration, converts it into a logical inference from a number of other intuitions, primary among them being that killing is wrong. He finds that the more he reduces his intuitions down to less controversial intuitions plus logic, the better able he is able to argue with other people and in favour of his legislation. Even though his base intuitions may not be in accord with others, he is able to build up to conclusions with which others agree and finally to try to convince them of his ultimate conclusion. He may win a few converts or, potentially, he may have his logic challenged by those on the other side. He has taken the risk of challenge with the benefit of the chance to challenge. The risk has been worth it to convert others.
One might argue, however, that Fred has only let logic enter his system in the case of abortion, and only there because he cares enough. Anyone who tries to talk to him about climate change would have their pleas fall on deaf ears. However, it is not so simple. Once Fred has acknowledged the value of logic and consistency, this demands that it spread out across all his views. One may use a logical analogy to abortion in order to convince him of another view. Moreover, if he refuses to logically examine his beliefs in other areas Fred can be accused of hypocrisy, damaging his stance on abortion. Furthermore if Fred also cares about what he believes to be right, the introduction of logic in one area is more likely to make his think that he should logically examine all his beliefs. In short, although everyone has different issues about which they are passionate, this is likely to lead to the necessity of a defensible, consistent ethical view in all issues, or at least any brought up.
So to the hypothetical antagonist who claims that their system is entirely intuitionistic, the answer is simple. They may take that position and run with it, but they will never be able to persuade anyone on any ethical issue unless they allow in some element of logic to their views, and once that happens the process may not so easily be halted. The more forward thinking and efficient course is to open up all our ethical views to logical consideration, whittling down our intuitions as far as possible, so that we can face opposing views head on.
Monday, March 20, 2006
Animal Rights - Practicality
The last post was an attempt to explain why animals should be treated with empathy in their own right, rather than just in order to appease humans. Now it is necessary for me to explain how to apply this without ridiculous results. Clearly, we cannot give to all living things the rights we give to humans. We cannot have them vote in our elections, as they have not the means to understand the consequences. Similarly, the right to an education (at least in the human sense) would be wasted on them. Furthermore, do we give rights to plants? As they are living too then we need to explain if and why they are distinguished from animals in what rights we give to them.
The answer lies in the fact that as always the better empathy to apply is appreciative empathy. Remember, this means that rather than treating other beings as if they were you, you should treat them as you would want to be treated if you were as them. So the question is what would they not like to have done to them? Now, sadly we can only experience being human, so it is impossible to know exactly. Some have taken this to mean that we cannot say that any of them experience pain and suffering, and so we cannot seriously contemplate animal rights. However, I say this is misguided. We cannot know that anyone other than ourselves really experiences pain and suffering. The whole point of empathy is to impute our understanding of positive and negative to others in order to do good to them. Our brains are wired up to recognise pleasure and pain in others, and to an extent in animals. We should use this, and all scientific methods available, to save animals from unnecessary pain and degradation.
So far this is pretty obvious to any who care about the rights of animals. Of course we should help them to avoid unnecessary pain and suffering. However, the next step is more difficult for many to take: What about death? There are a great many who will quite certainly say that animals must not be unduly distressed, but then accept mass slaughter of them, especially when it comes to food for humans. Often this is because they are so used to eating meat that the idea that it is wrong seems ridiculous. However, many of the arguments used to justify the practice would be seen for their weakness in other areas, and it is only here that they are allowed a sense of reasonableness (remember, I am only dealing here with people who do in fact accept that animals should have rights).
The best and most widely used of these is that it is natural for humans to eat meat. The argument from nature is bizarre in that it is used so selectively, for so few purposes, and yet many people give it much weight when it is. It is respected by many when used against homosexuality (ignoring the many examples of it in nature) and in favour of meat eating. But what if we were to accept this argument in a principled way? What is and is not in our nature? Evolution gave us what was necessary to survive, and especially for men this left strong desires for sex and violence. In many ways those are basic to our nature. The nature of men is arguably promiscuity, and yet we do not place any virtue on this. The same applies to violent conflict, even if we see it as necessary on occasion. Almost no-one truly believes that ethics should be determined by our nature and impulses. If it was then any kind of society or consideration for others beyond self-interest would be frowned upon. Clearly nature is not enough to found any kind of argument for eating meat.
A more sophisticated argument is necessity. The argument goes that unlike random torture of animals for pleasure, killing them for food fulfils a basic human need - sustinence. Now clearly the literal truth of this cannot really be argued any more. Vegetarians can live perfectly healthy lifestyles. What the argument has devolved to is one of convenience. It may well be more convenient to eat meat rather than living as a vegetarian, but since when has this ever determined ethics? It would seem incredible if convenience could be used to subvert ethical considerations. To use an example from within the question of animals, it will often be more convenient (which means more cost effective) to keep chickens locked up and force fed food rather than allowed to roam free when it comes to getting eggs. Does this allow us to ignore the ethical considerations of poorly treating these chickens. Again, if one does not believe animals have any rights, contrary to my previous post, then this will not persuade. But if, like myself and I believe a majority, you believe they do then this argument from convenience cannot be allowed to stand. (Similarly the Christian idea of human dominion over animals may prevent abuse of them which damages their worth to humans but cannot condemn and may indeed positively encourage cruelty in situations like here where it reduces the resources used up.)
A true argument for necessity may however be launched in favour of animal testing for medical research. This requires careful consideration. In essence the argument is that even though animals have these rights, they are prima facie or utilitarian (on the balance of goods) only and so can be overridden where necessity (ie. respect for human life) dictates. This suffers the problems of simplistic utilitarianism and if it were applied to humans the problems would be incredibly clear. If the rights to freedom from torture and death are only prima facie, to be overridden in order to prevent a greater volume of torture and death, then it would be morally justifiable to do testing not on animals but on human prisoners, especially since they would be more effective that way. The fact that such human experimentation appears abhorrent lends support to my view that empathy makes such rights definite, not utilitarian. (To clarify, I am not saying they could not necessarily be overridden in certain circumstances like killing for self-defence. Indeed my second abortion post argued that even if a foetus is a human life, respect for the dignity of the mother can override its right to life. However, I am saying that it can never be reason enough merely to say that it helps more people if we violate this right.)
So a number of possibilities can be identified. No rights for humans or animals has been rejected out of hand. Rights for humans but not for animals was dealt with in the previous pose. Definite rights for both is my argument. Utilitarian rights for both would appear abhorrent (on the human side) to empathy and most thinking. Therefore supporters of animal testing would have to support definite rights for humans, but only utilitarian rights for animals. However, this distinction is arbitrary. A very good reason would have to be found to give an entirely different type of right to the two groups, and the reasons given have fallen very short.
The clearest problem with most of the suggestions for morally distinguishing humans and animals is that they are ignored when applied to humans. Appeals that animals are stupider or not self-aware or cannot themselves empathise do not account for humans who are stupid, not self-aware or unable to empathise. No one would suggest that their rights should be considered lesser because of this. In essence it is not the type of mind but the body, the shell surrounding it, which determines whether such people think these rights should be surperior or inferior. There is clearly no principled reason for this. Appreciative empathy only varies depending on what would be appreciated by the object of the empathy. It does not punish them for lacking empathy themselves. Unless we are to abandon the norms of ethics and resort to the law of the jungle, they must apply to those who will not apply them back to us. Otherwise they are not ethical principles at all, only self-interested and cynical pacts.
So what are we left with? Once one accepts that animals deserve some rights, it seems impossible to identify a reason to deny them the same rights as humans (subject to the appreciative empathy filter of only rights which they will appreciate) which could not apply to some humans. Unless we radically devalue the protections rights give to humans, convenience and even necessity in the utilitarian sense cannot justify their torture and death.
There is one final, somewhat bizarre argument which seems to underlie many arguments of those who eat meat while arguing that animals should not be treated cruelly. This is that killing them is okay as long as it is painless. They are not suffering, so it is not wrong (this is often annexed to the convenience argument to tip the scales in favour of allowing it). This goes right to the heart of the question of what is wrong with murder. Of course, none of these people would suggest that murder of humans is okay as long as painless and without causing fear. Instead they would suggest that somehow the wrong of killing is limited to humans. Again, this distinction makes no sense. Why is painlessly killing a human sleeping soundly in her bed wrong? The reason which appeals to me most is that you rob them of something: Their awareness, their mind, their memories and experience. This of course applies equally to animals. Any distinction will again be one which could apply to any human and is not morally significant in any normal scenario. Equally the rationale that one violates the person's autonomy applies equally well to animals. Whatever reason is used for the distinction, there is no reason that killing can be excused just because it is painless.
It has been argued in this post that once it is accepted that animals are worthy of rights so, as the last post argued, they should be treated well for their own sakes rather than for the benefit of people, they must be accorded the same rights as humans as far as they can appreciate them. The distinctions offered to support eating meat and animal testing are unprincipled and illogical. Hopefully this will help those who do not understand my vegetarianism, and perhaps persuade others to consider the issues for themselves. If you cannot find a way, given what I have said, to justify these distinctions, please ask yourself this: How can conveniences like eating meat be worth violating the ethical standards we hold ourselves to in other areas? Do we actually have ethical standards? Or do we only have them until it is convenient to cast them aside? Goodnight all.
The answer lies in the fact that as always the better empathy to apply is appreciative empathy. Remember, this means that rather than treating other beings as if they were you, you should treat them as you would want to be treated if you were as them. So the question is what would they not like to have done to them? Now, sadly we can only experience being human, so it is impossible to know exactly. Some have taken this to mean that we cannot say that any of them experience pain and suffering, and so we cannot seriously contemplate animal rights. However, I say this is misguided. We cannot know that anyone other than ourselves really experiences pain and suffering. The whole point of empathy is to impute our understanding of positive and negative to others in order to do good to them. Our brains are wired up to recognise pleasure and pain in others, and to an extent in animals. We should use this, and all scientific methods available, to save animals from unnecessary pain and degradation.
So far this is pretty obvious to any who care about the rights of animals. Of course we should help them to avoid unnecessary pain and suffering. However, the next step is more difficult for many to take: What about death? There are a great many who will quite certainly say that animals must not be unduly distressed, but then accept mass slaughter of them, especially when it comes to food for humans. Often this is because they are so used to eating meat that the idea that it is wrong seems ridiculous. However, many of the arguments used to justify the practice would be seen for their weakness in other areas, and it is only here that they are allowed a sense of reasonableness (remember, I am only dealing here with people who do in fact accept that animals should have rights).
The best and most widely used of these is that it is natural for humans to eat meat. The argument from nature is bizarre in that it is used so selectively, for so few purposes, and yet many people give it much weight when it is. It is respected by many when used against homosexuality (ignoring the many examples of it in nature) and in favour of meat eating. But what if we were to accept this argument in a principled way? What is and is not in our nature? Evolution gave us what was necessary to survive, and especially for men this left strong desires for sex and violence. In many ways those are basic to our nature. The nature of men is arguably promiscuity, and yet we do not place any virtue on this. The same applies to violent conflict, even if we see it as necessary on occasion. Almost no-one truly believes that ethics should be determined by our nature and impulses. If it was then any kind of society or consideration for others beyond self-interest would be frowned upon. Clearly nature is not enough to found any kind of argument for eating meat.
A more sophisticated argument is necessity. The argument goes that unlike random torture of animals for pleasure, killing them for food fulfils a basic human need - sustinence. Now clearly the literal truth of this cannot really be argued any more. Vegetarians can live perfectly healthy lifestyles. What the argument has devolved to is one of convenience. It may well be more convenient to eat meat rather than living as a vegetarian, but since when has this ever determined ethics? It would seem incredible if convenience could be used to subvert ethical considerations. To use an example from within the question of animals, it will often be more convenient (which means more cost effective) to keep chickens locked up and force fed food rather than allowed to roam free when it comes to getting eggs. Does this allow us to ignore the ethical considerations of poorly treating these chickens. Again, if one does not believe animals have any rights, contrary to my previous post, then this will not persuade. But if, like myself and I believe a majority, you believe they do then this argument from convenience cannot be allowed to stand. (Similarly the Christian idea of human dominion over animals may prevent abuse of them which damages their worth to humans but cannot condemn and may indeed positively encourage cruelty in situations like here where it reduces the resources used up.)
A true argument for necessity may however be launched in favour of animal testing for medical research. This requires careful consideration. In essence the argument is that even though animals have these rights, they are prima facie or utilitarian (on the balance of goods) only and so can be overridden where necessity (ie. respect for human life) dictates. This suffers the problems of simplistic utilitarianism and if it were applied to humans the problems would be incredibly clear. If the rights to freedom from torture and death are only prima facie, to be overridden in order to prevent a greater volume of torture and death, then it would be morally justifiable to do testing not on animals but on human prisoners, especially since they would be more effective that way. The fact that such human experimentation appears abhorrent lends support to my view that empathy makes such rights definite, not utilitarian. (To clarify, I am not saying they could not necessarily be overridden in certain circumstances like killing for self-defence. Indeed my second abortion post argued that even if a foetus is a human life, respect for the dignity of the mother can override its right to life. However, I am saying that it can never be reason enough merely to say that it helps more people if we violate this right.)
So a number of possibilities can be identified. No rights for humans or animals has been rejected out of hand. Rights for humans but not for animals was dealt with in the previous pose. Definite rights for both is my argument. Utilitarian rights for both would appear abhorrent (on the human side) to empathy and most thinking. Therefore supporters of animal testing would have to support definite rights for humans, but only utilitarian rights for animals. However, this distinction is arbitrary. A very good reason would have to be found to give an entirely different type of right to the two groups, and the reasons given have fallen very short.
The clearest problem with most of the suggestions for morally distinguishing humans and animals is that they are ignored when applied to humans. Appeals that animals are stupider or not self-aware or cannot themselves empathise do not account for humans who are stupid, not self-aware or unable to empathise. No one would suggest that their rights should be considered lesser because of this. In essence it is not the type of mind but the body, the shell surrounding it, which determines whether such people think these rights should be surperior or inferior. There is clearly no principled reason for this. Appreciative empathy only varies depending on what would be appreciated by the object of the empathy. It does not punish them for lacking empathy themselves. Unless we are to abandon the norms of ethics and resort to the law of the jungle, they must apply to those who will not apply them back to us. Otherwise they are not ethical principles at all, only self-interested and cynical pacts.
So what are we left with? Once one accepts that animals deserve some rights, it seems impossible to identify a reason to deny them the same rights as humans (subject to the appreciative empathy filter of only rights which they will appreciate) which could not apply to some humans. Unless we radically devalue the protections rights give to humans, convenience and even necessity in the utilitarian sense cannot justify their torture and death.
There is one final, somewhat bizarre argument which seems to underlie many arguments of those who eat meat while arguing that animals should not be treated cruelly. This is that killing them is okay as long as it is painless. They are not suffering, so it is not wrong (this is often annexed to the convenience argument to tip the scales in favour of allowing it). This goes right to the heart of the question of what is wrong with murder. Of course, none of these people would suggest that murder of humans is okay as long as painless and without causing fear. Instead they would suggest that somehow the wrong of killing is limited to humans. Again, this distinction makes no sense. Why is painlessly killing a human sleeping soundly in her bed wrong? The reason which appeals to me most is that you rob them of something: Their awareness, their mind, their memories and experience. This of course applies equally to animals. Any distinction will again be one which could apply to any human and is not morally significant in any normal scenario. Equally the rationale that one violates the person's autonomy applies equally well to animals. Whatever reason is used for the distinction, there is no reason that killing can be excused just because it is painless.
It has been argued in this post that once it is accepted that animals are worthy of rights so, as the last post argued, they should be treated well for their own sakes rather than for the benefit of people, they must be accorded the same rights as humans as far as they can appreciate them. The distinctions offered to support eating meat and animal testing are unprincipled and illogical. Hopefully this will help those who do not understand my vegetarianism, and perhaps persuade others to consider the issues for themselves. If you cannot find a way, given what I have said, to justify these distinctions, please ask yourself this: How can conveniences like eating meat be worth violating the ethical standards we hold ourselves to in other areas? Do we actually have ethical standards? Or do we only have them until it is convenient to cast them aside? Goodnight all.
Thursday, December 15, 2005
Animal Rights - Justification
I have been a vegetarian for seven months now. The cravings for meat have mostly gone away now, and I feel happy to have gone with my conscience on this one. However, I still get baffled friends and relatives asking me why I would give up meat. I think it's time to properly explain, in the context of a general consideration of animal rights.
Animal rights have a bad reputation at the moment. Certain extremist proponents have come as close to domestic terrorism as we have seen in England in recent years. In my university city of Oxford, property belonging to my college has been burned down in the name of animal liberation. This has turned some people away from animal rights completely.
This is a completely illogical and irrational response, however. The methods by which an ideology is pushed do not affect the merits of the ideology itself (unless it encourages the methods of course). Can we look back at the civil rights movement in the USA and the advances for racial equality gained and disdain them because of the violence supported by those such as Malcolm X and the Black Panthers? Of course not. The ends do not justify the means (at least usually) but the means do not tarnish the goals.
Furthermore, and even more profoundly, the fact is that the subjects of the ideology (the animals) had nothing to do with the misbehaviour in their favour. While even in the above example one may say that those who commit terrible acts run the risk of damage to their cause, it is completely unfair to say the same where they are acting for the benefit of another group entirely. It is as ridiculous as disdaigning action against child cruelty because of misbehaviour by organisations opposing child cruelty. Opposing and disdaigning the organisation is rational and principled - doing the same to the cause is neither.
But now to more weighty considerations. To what extent should we protect animal rights? The beginning point as usual, is here empathy. The question is whether and to what extent empathy should be extended to non-humans. Whether animal rights should exist at all is dealt with in this post, and to what extent they should exist in the next.
There is a point of view that empathy should be limited to humans entirely. We should consider animals merely in terms of their value and utility to humanity. By this logic a pet cat should not be tortured due to the distress caused to the owner. Presumably the action would be morally neutral if the cat were an unloved stray, or if its owner did not care for it at all.
While disagreeing with this view with a vehemence, it is possible for there to be a logical consistency to it. A lot of laws against cruelty to animals can in theory be reduced to sparing humans the knowledge that animals are suffering.
Justifying the separation of humans and animals is tricky, however. It can often be explained by a biological instinct to favour our own race over other races. However, explaining is not justifying. In morality, it is necessary to do more than merely explain a stance in order to justify its adoption. The biological instinct can also lead us to favour our family over outsiders, our country over other countries, and our race over other races. Faced with that, few would suggest that it justifies any moral stance.
It is argued by many religious people that God favours humanity. I have already outlined why I believe that God cannot be seen as the ultimate moral authority. If one accepts that animals are unworthy of empathy merely because God says so, without any justification for this, then one has surrendered one's own moral reasoning. In such a case trying to convince such a person of a different moral view is probably futile - the only block which can be challenged in the system is blind acceptance of what they believe God to say.
Outside of that narrow category, other justifications are given. The idea that God created animals for humanity has little bearing. As explained before, there is no reason why God has the authority to create or vary the worth of individuals. He could not make animals worth less than humans any more than he could make women worth less than men, or black men worth less than white men (although both have been so argued). There would have to be something inherent in animals to make them worth less.
Instead, the idea of objective worth is a human notion with no reality attached. No matter how many subjective valuations of worth are made, this never adds up to an objective valuation. Nothing, human, animal or inanimate, is objectively worth anything.
In my Empathy post I explained why empathy was a good basis for a moral system. It does not require objective worth in order for this to work. However, many of the reasons for it boil down to empathy being instinctually good, and benefitting ourselves in the long run. It is possible to restrict it to humanity without destroying the basis upon which our faith in empathy is built. On the other hand, it is (or at least was) possible to restrict it to our own race in such a manner, and yet most good people today refuse to do so. I refuse to do so too, and I refuse to restrict it to humanity. I do so for what can be thought of as the following reason:
Empathy is about helping those you could have been. You could have been born otherwise, and your empathy helps those who are not you. Empathy ensures that had you in fact been born otherwise, you would have benefitted from this.
This is not a justification for empathy, but the rationale that I believe is supported by the partial justifications. It explains the empathetic impulse, it is intellectually coherent and it gives a self-interest slant to altruism. It is the most enlightened self-interest there can be.
With that in mind, we can explain why empathy should equally apply to other races. It also extends far beyond our species, to any living thing. In the next post I will consider how it should be applied in such a way, to such a diverse range of objects, without losing any of its coherence.
Animal rights have a bad reputation at the moment. Certain extremist proponents have come as close to domestic terrorism as we have seen in England in recent years. In my university city of Oxford, property belonging to my college has been burned down in the name of animal liberation. This has turned some people away from animal rights completely.
This is a completely illogical and irrational response, however. The methods by which an ideology is pushed do not affect the merits of the ideology itself (unless it encourages the methods of course). Can we look back at the civil rights movement in the USA and the advances for racial equality gained and disdain them because of the violence supported by those such as Malcolm X and the Black Panthers? Of course not. The ends do not justify the means (at least usually) but the means do not tarnish the goals.
Furthermore, and even more profoundly, the fact is that the subjects of the ideology (the animals) had nothing to do with the misbehaviour in their favour. While even in the above example one may say that those who commit terrible acts run the risk of damage to their cause, it is completely unfair to say the same where they are acting for the benefit of another group entirely. It is as ridiculous as disdaigning action against child cruelty because of misbehaviour by organisations opposing child cruelty. Opposing and disdaigning the organisation is rational and principled - doing the same to the cause is neither.
But now to more weighty considerations. To what extent should we protect animal rights? The beginning point as usual, is here empathy. The question is whether and to what extent empathy should be extended to non-humans. Whether animal rights should exist at all is dealt with in this post, and to what extent they should exist in the next.
There is a point of view that empathy should be limited to humans entirely. We should consider animals merely in terms of their value and utility to humanity. By this logic a pet cat should not be tortured due to the distress caused to the owner. Presumably the action would be morally neutral if the cat were an unloved stray, or if its owner did not care for it at all.
While disagreeing with this view with a vehemence, it is possible for there to be a logical consistency to it. A lot of laws against cruelty to animals can in theory be reduced to sparing humans the knowledge that animals are suffering.
Justifying the separation of humans and animals is tricky, however. It can often be explained by a biological instinct to favour our own race over other races. However, explaining is not justifying. In morality, it is necessary to do more than merely explain a stance in order to justify its adoption. The biological instinct can also lead us to favour our family over outsiders, our country over other countries, and our race over other races. Faced with that, few would suggest that it justifies any moral stance.
It is argued by many religious people that God favours humanity. I have already outlined why I believe that God cannot be seen as the ultimate moral authority. If one accepts that animals are unworthy of empathy merely because God says so, without any justification for this, then one has surrendered one's own moral reasoning. In such a case trying to convince such a person of a different moral view is probably futile - the only block which can be challenged in the system is blind acceptance of what they believe God to say.
Outside of that narrow category, other justifications are given. The idea that God created animals for humanity has little bearing. As explained before, there is no reason why God has the authority to create or vary the worth of individuals. He could not make animals worth less than humans any more than he could make women worth less than men, or black men worth less than white men (although both have been so argued). There would have to be something inherent in animals to make them worth less.
Instead, the idea of objective worth is a human notion with no reality attached. No matter how many subjective valuations of worth are made, this never adds up to an objective valuation. Nothing, human, animal or inanimate, is objectively worth anything.
In my Empathy post I explained why empathy was a good basis for a moral system. It does not require objective worth in order for this to work. However, many of the reasons for it boil down to empathy being instinctually good, and benefitting ourselves in the long run. It is possible to restrict it to humanity without destroying the basis upon which our faith in empathy is built. On the other hand, it is (or at least was) possible to restrict it to our own race in such a manner, and yet most good people today refuse to do so. I refuse to do so too, and I refuse to restrict it to humanity. I do so for what can be thought of as the following reason:
Empathy is about helping those you could have been. You could have been born otherwise, and your empathy helps those who are not you. Empathy ensures that had you in fact been born otherwise, you would have benefitted from this.
This is not a justification for empathy, but the rationale that I believe is supported by the partial justifications. It explains the empathetic impulse, it is intellectually coherent and it gives a self-interest slant to altruism. It is the most enlightened self-interest there can be.
With that in mind, we can explain why empathy should equally apply to other races. It also extends far beyond our species, to any living thing. In the next post I will consider how it should be applied in such a way, to such a diverse range of objects, without losing any of its coherence.
Friday, September 16, 2005
Abortion And Rape
It has always struck me that one of the biggest problems for the mainstream pro-life movement is their position when it comes to abortion after rape. It seems difficult for them to find a position on the issue consistent with the values they claim to espouse. Here is why.
In the last post I mentioned two big arguments of the pro-life movement: The supremacy of the right to life over other rights (like dignity and autonomy), and the (at least partial) responsibility of the woman for her pregnancy. The scenario where a woman is raped creates a tension between these arguments.
The mainstream position seems to be that rape is an exception to the general rule that abortion is always wrong. Why is this? It is true that an unwanted pregnancy can feel much worse if caused by rape. The feeling of violation can be extended throughout the pregnancy, and the woman might be torn between giving the child up for adoption (which can be a heart-breaking experience in itself) and keeping the child around, a constant reminder of the terrible act. So the consequences for the mother are likely to be worse.
But looking at the situation honestly, has the sole fact that the consequences are worse ever motivated the mainstream pro-life movement to make exceptions? A young teenage girl can be terrified of what is happening, completely unable to cope emotionally, and this tends not to change the judgement that 'abortion is murder'. Only if the woman's life is in danger will an exception otherwise be made, and that is an extension of the idea of the right to life. So if not the extent of the consequences, then what motivates the exception in the case of rape?
Well, it is the second principle above, that normally the mother gives up some of her rights by dint of being responsible for the pregnancy. Here of course there is no responsibility so the principle is applied to give an exception. The major problem for pro-lifers is that adopting this contradicts the idea that the right to life trumps all other rights. If this were truly taken seriously, it would not matter that the pregnancy was no fault of the mother. In order for this to matter, the fault of the mother must be the deciding factor above the life of the child. Acknowledging that the rights of the mother have some part to play means accepting that the whole thing must be considered on a case by case basis, and not purely on the basis that there is a child who must not be killed.
So what is the alternative? Some go further than the above and argue that abortion is wrong even in cases of rape. It avoids the above problem of compromising the life of the baby for the sake of the mother. However, it appears an incredibly uncompassionate response. It also jettisons the principle of the fault of the woman by not needing any fault on her part to require her to carry the baby. It means that even an unarguable victim is forced to undergo the further consequences of an unwanted pregnancy without fault, rather than being given the chance to prevent these consequences. I do not believe it to be too emotive to suggest that in a way this compounds the rape - enforcing a violation of bodily sanctity on one who is completely blameless.
To summarise: To make an exception for abortion after rape compromises on the absolute supremacy of the right to life, and to make no exception compromises on the requirement for fault on the mother's part. So, if this is true does this mean the pro-life ideal is inherently flawed? Not necessarily. It just means that to achieve consistency, only one of these principles can be maintained.
If the supremacy of the right to life is maintained, then no exception is made for rape. The woman is denied a means to end the violation of her person started by the rapist. I consisder this horrible, but at least it is consistent.
If the fault of the woman is considered paramount, an exception can be made for rape. However, with the absolute supremacy of the sanctity of life removed, a balancing exercise must take place. If other rights can override it, then why not in some cases without rape? Could the distress and suffering incurred not outweigh the right to life even without rape involved? Insisting that rape is still the only exception begs the question of 'why?'. Why, if the right to life can be displaced? Logical consistency requires weighing up other situations to see if they too could justify abortion.
While this balancing exercise can be difficult, it can be a consistent position. However, it requires leaving behind the absolutist approach to abortion and adopting one of relativism, anathema to the mainstream pro-life movement. It also begs the question of who is to judge. The courts? The doctors?
Might it not be better leaving it up to individual conscience after all?
In the last post I mentioned two big arguments of the pro-life movement: The supremacy of the right to life over other rights (like dignity and autonomy), and the (at least partial) responsibility of the woman for her pregnancy. The scenario where a woman is raped creates a tension between these arguments.
The mainstream position seems to be that rape is an exception to the general rule that abortion is always wrong. Why is this? It is true that an unwanted pregnancy can feel much worse if caused by rape. The feeling of violation can be extended throughout the pregnancy, and the woman might be torn between giving the child up for adoption (which can be a heart-breaking experience in itself) and keeping the child around, a constant reminder of the terrible act. So the consequences for the mother are likely to be worse.
But looking at the situation honestly, has the sole fact that the consequences are worse ever motivated the mainstream pro-life movement to make exceptions? A young teenage girl can be terrified of what is happening, completely unable to cope emotionally, and this tends not to change the judgement that 'abortion is murder'. Only if the woman's life is in danger will an exception otherwise be made, and that is an extension of the idea of the right to life. So if not the extent of the consequences, then what motivates the exception in the case of rape?
Well, it is the second principle above, that normally the mother gives up some of her rights by dint of being responsible for the pregnancy. Here of course there is no responsibility so the principle is applied to give an exception. The major problem for pro-lifers is that adopting this contradicts the idea that the right to life trumps all other rights. If this were truly taken seriously, it would not matter that the pregnancy was no fault of the mother. In order for this to matter, the fault of the mother must be the deciding factor above the life of the child. Acknowledging that the rights of the mother have some part to play means accepting that the whole thing must be considered on a case by case basis, and not purely on the basis that there is a child who must not be killed.
So what is the alternative? Some go further than the above and argue that abortion is wrong even in cases of rape. It avoids the above problem of compromising the life of the baby for the sake of the mother. However, it appears an incredibly uncompassionate response. It also jettisons the principle of the fault of the woman by not needing any fault on her part to require her to carry the baby. It means that even an unarguable victim is forced to undergo the further consequences of an unwanted pregnancy without fault, rather than being given the chance to prevent these consequences. I do not believe it to be too emotive to suggest that in a way this compounds the rape - enforcing a violation of bodily sanctity on one who is completely blameless.
To summarise: To make an exception for abortion after rape compromises on the absolute supremacy of the right to life, and to make no exception compromises on the requirement for fault on the mother's part. So, if this is true does this mean the pro-life ideal is inherently flawed? Not necessarily. It just means that to achieve consistency, only one of these principles can be maintained.
If the supremacy of the right to life is maintained, then no exception is made for rape. The woman is denied a means to end the violation of her person started by the rapist. I consisder this horrible, but at least it is consistent.
If the fault of the woman is considered paramount, an exception can be made for rape. However, with the absolute supremacy of the sanctity of life removed, a balancing exercise must take place. If other rights can override it, then why not in some cases without rape? Could the distress and suffering incurred not outweigh the right to life even without rape involved? Insisting that rape is still the only exception begs the question of 'why?'. Why, if the right to life can be displaced? Logical consistency requires weighing up other situations to see if they too could justify abortion.
While this balancing exercise can be difficult, it can be a consistent position. However, it requires leaving behind the absolutist approach to abortion and adopting one of relativism, anathema to the mainstream pro-life movement. It also begs the question of who is to judge. The courts? The doctors?
Might it not be better leaving it up to individual conscience after all?
Thursday, September 15, 2005
Abortion And Autonomy
In the last post I noted that the problem with abortion is weighing up the different interests: Most obviously, the right to life of the foetus and the right to autonomy and choice of the woman. While I put forward one way people use to weigh up the situation (pre-existing attitudes to sex) I suggested that this was a poor way to consider the situation. Now I will explain one of the main reasons that I am pro-choice.
Looking at the two major competing interests as stated above, it is easy to quickly conclude that the right to life must trump all else, as superior and more important. This is one reason people argue the pro-life viewpoint. Another is the idea that the woman is (in cases other than rape) at least in part to blame for the pregnancy while the foetus is blameless. Therefore the benefit of the moral doubt must go to the foetus. In a way this suggests that as a punishment for consenting for sex, the woman gives up some rights over her autonomy. She has no right to complain as she could have prevented the whole situation from coming about.
These arguments should be kept in mind as I present my analogy, and I will come back to them. For the record, when I became a fully fledged liberal and attempted to apply the idea that people should have autonomy over their bodies and choices to my beliefs, abortion was one of the three main sticking areas (along with prostitution and drugs) which caused me a lot of trouble. It was a long time before I was able to put myself on one side of the fence on the issue, and it was only when I came up with my analogy that I was able to see the issue clearly.
The Driving Analogy:
A couple enjoy driving around in their new sports car. They are not going anywhere in it, just taking it around the roads at reasonably high speeds, the wind in their hair. There is of course always a risk while driving, but they are competent drivers and only think of the feeling of being on the open road.
One day, something terrible happens. They do not see a pedestrian until it is too late, and although they swerve to avoid him they hit him and the car crashes, knocking them both out.
When the woman of the couple wakes up she is in a hospital. Around her are doctors trying to reassure her, and as she becomes more lucid she realises that something feels wrong. Looking down, she sees many tubes attached to all different parts of her body. All of them lead across to an adjacent table, and on it lies the pedestrian they had hit. Before she can struggle and rip the tubes out, the doctors hold her and soothe her, telling her to relax.
Once she is awake, they explain to her what happened. Paramedics arrived at the scene of the crash and took the three injured people to hospital. It quickly became clear that the pedestrian was in bad shape. His organs were damaged, unable to perform their functions to keep him alive. He was also losing a lot of blood.
However, they realised that there was a way to save him. Using all their skill and technology they were able to hook him up to the woman, whose blood type matched his. By using the sustaining power of her almost undamaged body, they were able to keep him alive, and he is slowly starting to recover, by leeching nutrients from the woman's blood and using her organs.
This disturbs the woman much, but she is glad that the man is at least alive. However, she is shocked to learn that estimates suggest that the man will need to be hooked up to her, unconscious, for nearly nine months before he will be able to survive alone (and even then he will need constant care for some time). The woman is horrified at the idea of having him hooked up to her in this way for such a long period of time.
As time goes on she feels worse and worse as she can constantly feel the way her life is being leeched for the man's purposes. Her emotions go beyond her control and what she can do is restricted. She also finds out that unhooking him so he can live on his own is likely to be a very painful, exhausting and embarrassing procedure.
She starts to consider the possibility of refusing to continue her existance like this, removing the tubes and so letting the man die. As she considers this, she recieves guidance from two sources. One side call themselves pro-life, and insist that it would be murder to do so. They tell her that it is her own fault that she is in this situation, so she is obliged to let the man continue to leech her life force and undergo the final operation. The other side is pro-choice, and tell her that she has autonomy over her body, and so it remains her choice as to whether she removes the tubes or allows the man to stay like that. They say that no-one has the right to force her to remain like that.
End.
The question, of course, is which of the two sides would you agree was in the right? I will not patronise by going through the analogy explaining every line of it. Needless to say, the driving is sex, the crash is getting pregnant, and the pedestrian is the foetus growing in the womb. I would like to explain how this can help to shed some light on the issue of abortion.
Earlier I said that it can be easy to immediately conclude that the right to life is more important than anything else. I would say that the analogy might help to dispense with this particular gut feeling. While the right to life is important, I would argue that it is not enough to completely void the rights of others to autonomy and personal dignity. Other analogies could be given like this: A criminal threatens to kill a man unless his girlfriend allows him to have sex with her. While many would do it for their lovers, it would seem ludicrous to expect an absolute obligation to consent to sex to protect someone else's right to life. In the original analogy, the woman has to put up with much indignity and sacrifice some of her autonomy to keep the man alive - often pregnancy requires similar sacrifices. The point is that just because a life might be at stake, does not null and void all competing rights.
Secondly, it was suggested that some pro-lifers think the woman's choice should be nullified as punishment for partly causing the situation. If the response to this was not already clear, I would hope that the analogy would help to make it so. While it may be legitimate to associate blame with the act, the point is that the 'punishment' or consequences are wildly out of proportion with the infraction committed. It is like shoplifting in a country which executes theives. Even though the consequences might be foreseeable, it is not right to say that the consequences are fair because they are to blame. Our natural sense of justice (and empathy, I would hasten to add) requires that we only enforce consequences / punishment on people if it is proportional to the wrong done. In the analogy, while perhaps the driving was an unnecessary risk, the terrible consequences for the woman are out of proportion. Similarly the consequences of pregnancy on autonomy and dignity are far out of proportion to the 'wrong' of sex, particularly given the natural urges and societal pressures involved.
As such, it is argued that the analogy suggests that the decision must in the end be with the one whose dignity and autonomy is compromised. It is her sacrifice to make, not for someone else to force her to do so. The analogy made me firmly pro-choice, and remains my favourite way to explain my position.
Looking at the two major competing interests as stated above, it is easy to quickly conclude that the right to life must trump all else, as superior and more important. This is one reason people argue the pro-life viewpoint. Another is the idea that the woman is (in cases other than rape) at least in part to blame for the pregnancy while the foetus is blameless. Therefore the benefit of the moral doubt must go to the foetus. In a way this suggests that as a punishment for consenting for sex, the woman gives up some rights over her autonomy. She has no right to complain as she could have prevented the whole situation from coming about.
These arguments should be kept in mind as I present my analogy, and I will come back to them. For the record, when I became a fully fledged liberal and attempted to apply the idea that people should have autonomy over their bodies and choices to my beliefs, abortion was one of the three main sticking areas (along with prostitution and drugs) which caused me a lot of trouble. It was a long time before I was able to put myself on one side of the fence on the issue, and it was only when I came up with my analogy that I was able to see the issue clearly.
The Driving Analogy:
A couple enjoy driving around in their new sports car. They are not going anywhere in it, just taking it around the roads at reasonably high speeds, the wind in their hair. There is of course always a risk while driving, but they are competent drivers and only think of the feeling of being on the open road.
One day, something terrible happens. They do not see a pedestrian until it is too late, and although they swerve to avoid him they hit him and the car crashes, knocking them both out.
When the woman of the couple wakes up she is in a hospital. Around her are doctors trying to reassure her, and as she becomes more lucid she realises that something feels wrong. Looking down, she sees many tubes attached to all different parts of her body. All of them lead across to an adjacent table, and on it lies the pedestrian they had hit. Before she can struggle and rip the tubes out, the doctors hold her and soothe her, telling her to relax.
Once she is awake, they explain to her what happened. Paramedics arrived at the scene of the crash and took the three injured people to hospital. It quickly became clear that the pedestrian was in bad shape. His organs were damaged, unable to perform their functions to keep him alive. He was also losing a lot of blood.
However, they realised that there was a way to save him. Using all their skill and technology they were able to hook him up to the woman, whose blood type matched his. By using the sustaining power of her almost undamaged body, they were able to keep him alive, and he is slowly starting to recover, by leeching nutrients from the woman's blood and using her organs.
This disturbs the woman much, but she is glad that the man is at least alive. However, she is shocked to learn that estimates suggest that the man will need to be hooked up to her, unconscious, for nearly nine months before he will be able to survive alone (and even then he will need constant care for some time). The woman is horrified at the idea of having him hooked up to her in this way for such a long period of time.
As time goes on she feels worse and worse as she can constantly feel the way her life is being leeched for the man's purposes. Her emotions go beyond her control and what she can do is restricted. She also finds out that unhooking him so he can live on his own is likely to be a very painful, exhausting and embarrassing procedure.
She starts to consider the possibility of refusing to continue her existance like this, removing the tubes and so letting the man die. As she considers this, she recieves guidance from two sources. One side call themselves pro-life, and insist that it would be murder to do so. They tell her that it is her own fault that she is in this situation, so she is obliged to let the man continue to leech her life force and undergo the final operation. The other side is pro-choice, and tell her that she has autonomy over her body, and so it remains her choice as to whether she removes the tubes or allows the man to stay like that. They say that no-one has the right to force her to remain like that.
End.
The question, of course, is which of the two sides would you agree was in the right? I will not patronise by going through the analogy explaining every line of it. Needless to say, the driving is sex, the crash is getting pregnant, and the pedestrian is the foetus growing in the womb. I would like to explain how this can help to shed some light on the issue of abortion.
Earlier I said that it can be easy to immediately conclude that the right to life is more important than anything else. I would say that the analogy might help to dispense with this particular gut feeling. While the right to life is important, I would argue that it is not enough to completely void the rights of others to autonomy and personal dignity. Other analogies could be given like this: A criminal threatens to kill a man unless his girlfriend allows him to have sex with her. While many would do it for their lovers, it would seem ludicrous to expect an absolute obligation to consent to sex to protect someone else's right to life. In the original analogy, the woman has to put up with much indignity and sacrifice some of her autonomy to keep the man alive - often pregnancy requires similar sacrifices. The point is that just because a life might be at stake, does not null and void all competing rights.
Secondly, it was suggested that some pro-lifers think the woman's choice should be nullified as punishment for partly causing the situation. If the response to this was not already clear, I would hope that the analogy would help to make it so. While it may be legitimate to associate blame with the act, the point is that the 'punishment' or consequences are wildly out of proportion with the infraction committed. It is like shoplifting in a country which executes theives. Even though the consequences might be foreseeable, it is not right to say that the consequences are fair because they are to blame. Our natural sense of justice (and empathy, I would hasten to add) requires that we only enforce consequences / punishment on people if it is proportional to the wrong done. In the analogy, while perhaps the driving was an unnecessary risk, the terrible consequences for the woman are out of proportion. Similarly the consequences of pregnancy on autonomy and dignity are far out of proportion to the 'wrong' of sex, particularly given the natural urges and societal pressures involved.
As such, it is argued that the analogy suggests that the decision must in the end be with the one whose dignity and autonomy is compromised. It is her sacrifice to make, not for someone else to force her to do so. The analogy made me firmly pro-choice, and remains my favourite way to explain my position.
Wednesday, September 14, 2005
Abortion And Sex
Of all the hot-button moral issues out there, abortion is quite possibly the most sensitive, and most disputed. When all other arguments have been uneasily reconciled, there will always bile and vitriole on this one. There are huge swathes of people on either side of the issue who will budge no inch, angrily defending their point of view. Then there are those in the middle, carefully drawing out a compromise which can never be reached. Other questions like stem cell research and cloning rest on this one. And it will never be settled, not really. Perhaps that is for the best.
A lot has been said about abortion, and so it is extremely difficult to say much that has not been said before. However, here is what I feel I have to offer to the everlasting debate.
In this post I will explain some thoughts on the motivations of those on either side. While no argument should be assessed based on the merits of its proponents (which would be an argumentum ad hominem), it is useful to examine them nevertheless. It seems to me that the vast majority of people on both sides either care about both the mother and the foetus, or would do so were it not for an attitude (call it a prejudice) developed due to this issue. Only a very minor fringe would otherwise act with complete disregard for a woman's autonomy or the wellbeing of something which can look and appear so human. So, given this groundpoint, what makes a person come down on one side or the other, to weigh up the interests and make their decision?
I would like to stress that many base their opinion on logical reasoning, personal experience and general gut feeling on the issue. Others are pushed one way or another by religious leaders, parents, friends etc. But I would argue that a fundamental factor which has helped to split opinion on this down traditional liberal / conservative lines is the attitude people have to another issue: SEX.
To the extent that I accuse either side here, I accuse them fairly equally. Those that come in with a sex-positive, free love kind of attitude are far more likely to be pro-choice. The reason is obvious. Not to mince words, but it is much easier to advocate the positive aspects of sex while downplaying the risks and consequences. While screening and a degree of care can minimise the risks of STDs, and treatment is generally uncontroversial, it is more difficult to talk away the risk of pregnancy. Firstly, because it potentially involves another, innocent third party (the potential child) rather than the willing participants. Secondly because it always has been, and always will be a real possibility. Short of extreme measures infeasible for many, the risk of pregnancy will never go away. By having abortion as a way of clearing up any 'accidents', the problem is solved. Sex can be relatively simple and without too many negative consequences. In short, promoting abortion fits a pro-sex agenda.
What of the other side? Those that come in with a sex-negative, restrictive and prudish kind of attitude are far more likely to be pro-life. For many of them, people need to be warned off any kind of sexual activity before marriage. Particularly in the USA, where anti-abortion activists have much influence, a lot of the reason for this attitude is based not on fear of consequences, but on religious teaching (which, ironically, I would argue probably originated from fear of consequences, but has now been merely cristalised into dogma). It is very hard to sell this reasoning to youth, and abortion becomes the logical way around this. By equating abortion with murder, many are (perhaps only subconsciously) trying to scare young people off sex. 'Look at the possible consequences', they are saying. 'If you dabble then you may have to choose between raising a baby or being a murderer.' It is a clever method of control. In short, condemning abortion fits an anti-sex agenda.
Again, there are many, especially outside of the USA, with good, sound reasons for their opinions on abortion. I like to think I am one of them, and I will explain my opinion in my next post. For now though, I am trying to point out that a lot of the arguing either way is actually based on an attitude to sex rather than to abortion itself. I just hope that eventually more people can learn to block that out and look instead to the issue itself, with its own, much more important, facets.
A lot has been said about abortion, and so it is extremely difficult to say much that has not been said before. However, here is what I feel I have to offer to the everlasting debate.
In this post I will explain some thoughts on the motivations of those on either side. While no argument should be assessed based on the merits of its proponents (which would be an argumentum ad hominem), it is useful to examine them nevertheless. It seems to me that the vast majority of people on both sides either care about both the mother and the foetus, or would do so were it not for an attitude (call it a prejudice) developed due to this issue. Only a very minor fringe would otherwise act with complete disregard for a woman's autonomy or the wellbeing of something which can look and appear so human. So, given this groundpoint, what makes a person come down on one side or the other, to weigh up the interests and make their decision?
I would like to stress that many base their opinion on logical reasoning, personal experience and general gut feeling on the issue. Others are pushed one way or another by religious leaders, parents, friends etc. But I would argue that a fundamental factor which has helped to split opinion on this down traditional liberal / conservative lines is the attitude people have to another issue: SEX.
To the extent that I accuse either side here, I accuse them fairly equally. Those that come in with a sex-positive, free love kind of attitude are far more likely to be pro-choice. The reason is obvious. Not to mince words, but it is much easier to advocate the positive aspects of sex while downplaying the risks and consequences. While screening and a degree of care can minimise the risks of STDs, and treatment is generally uncontroversial, it is more difficult to talk away the risk of pregnancy. Firstly, because it potentially involves another, innocent third party (the potential child) rather than the willing participants. Secondly because it always has been, and always will be a real possibility. Short of extreme measures infeasible for many, the risk of pregnancy will never go away. By having abortion as a way of clearing up any 'accidents', the problem is solved. Sex can be relatively simple and without too many negative consequences. In short, promoting abortion fits a pro-sex agenda.
What of the other side? Those that come in with a sex-negative, restrictive and prudish kind of attitude are far more likely to be pro-life. For many of them, people need to be warned off any kind of sexual activity before marriage. Particularly in the USA, where anti-abortion activists have much influence, a lot of the reason for this attitude is based not on fear of consequences, but on religious teaching (which, ironically, I would argue probably originated from fear of consequences, but has now been merely cristalised into dogma). It is very hard to sell this reasoning to youth, and abortion becomes the logical way around this. By equating abortion with murder, many are (perhaps only subconsciously) trying to scare young people off sex. 'Look at the possible consequences', they are saying. 'If you dabble then you may have to choose between raising a baby or being a murderer.' It is a clever method of control. In short, condemning abortion fits an anti-sex agenda.
Again, there are many, especially outside of the USA, with good, sound reasons for their opinions on abortion. I like to think I am one of them, and I will explain my opinion in my next post. For now though, I am trying to point out that a lot of the arguing either way is actually based on an attitude to sex rather than to abortion itself. I just hope that eventually more people can learn to block that out and look instead to the issue itself, with its own, much more important, facets.
Wednesday, April 06, 2005
Empathy
The past few (regular) posts were used to introduce my view of systems of morality. The two on relativism argued that all systems must be given credance as there is no universal standard by which to evaluate them. The last one was to explain how these systems could interact through moral arguments. Now it is time to look at my moral system, the one which I would recommend, by considering its fundamental basis: Empathy.
What is empathy?
As a base description, empathy is the ability to see things from another point of view, and act with consideration of the needs and desires of others rather than just one's own.
Why empathy?
On its face, this question is ridiculous. If, as argued before, the basis of one's system cannot further be justified without going down to further base facts, how can I attempt to explain my reliance on empathy? Well, my reasoning is this: Although I cannot absolutely show why empathy is my basis, I can give partial explanations. None of these is enough as a block to support empathy. However, together they might at least give a way of defending empathy from other systems seeking to claim dominance. If one wishes to see these as 'mini-blocks' holding up empathy, they are free to do so!
The first answer to "Why empathy?" is that it is a key feature of most moral theories. Most religions include in their ethical codes something along the lines of what is, for example, expressed in the Christian tradition as "Do unto others what you would have them do unto you". Of course this key command predates Christianity and indeed, all modern religions. It manifested in pagan systems. In fact, my problems with religion generally manifest when their ethical codes deviate from this command. For example, for many Christians it is subservient to the obligation to obey God. As far as non-religious ethical systems go, Utilitarianism and Kant's writings also give examples of sytems focussing on harm caused. The best way to assess harm seems to be through empathy.
However, I would argue that the case for empathy goes much deeper. A second reason to use it as a basis seems to me more pertinent. Many of us like to believe that we are different from animals in some way, separate and above them. Personally, I do not have much time for such beliefs, as I see them used to excuse ourselves of fearing behaving like savages. We are part of the animal kingdom, but I can well understand the desire to separate ourselves from the rawest part of nature, survival of the fittest. I see in empathy the only instinct we have to look beyond the purely selfish and consider the well-being of others. As such, it is our way of moving beyond the unforgiving part of nature. This is better for most of us, as many would not survive in our natural state. Even without resorting to empathy for the plight of others, empathy makes sense from a purely selfish (enlightened self-interest) point of view.
On a connected note, empathy is what allows society to function. Without it all would attempt to meet their own needs and people could not draw together to provide the safety net for the less fortunate. I do not argue that society is always a positive thing, but for the majority whose lives it has enriched should see this as a point in favour of empathy.
An important stage in the development of children is them learning to see things from the point of view of others. As they learn and agree to compromise, we consider them as maturing. Most things done in childhood, now considered unconscionable, were in large part due to a lack of empathy. Through the idea of 'maturing' we show how it is instinctive that empathy is a laudable quality.
How far should empathy go?
This is a complicated question. Most would agree that it is good to consider the opinions of others, but many would say that they must come second to moral rules. For example, this would be used as an argument for banning euthanasia, as the moral rule to not kill would override the wishes of the person to be killed. Since the argument here is that empathy must be the basis for moral rules, these limits need to be clarified. If morality allows too much acceptance of other people's desires, it would be unable to condemn them for anything.
The answer here is not too difficult, however. If empathy is the foundation, then empathy should only go as far as actions which do not themselves violate empathy. The reason that empathy would not generally be used to argue against punishing people for crimes is that to do so would aid crime itself, which is (at least in the conception to be argued later) a violation of empathy. Therefore, as long as the punishment does not outweigh the violation so as to itself violate empathy, it is compatible with this ethical system.
This can of course get rather complicated. Let us take an example where a policeman catches and arrests a burglar in the act. However, the burglar's accomplice sees this and attacks the policeman. How should this be assessed? The burglar's act was a clear violation of empathy for the property owner. Thus empathy is not necessary for his actions. The policeman clearly violated his wishes by arresting him, but this is not a violation of empathy as he, like us, need not have empathy for the burglar's activities. Furthermore, the policeman's actions further empathy overall, by encouraging empathy for people's property rights. We empathise with the policemans's actions. We do not empathise with the accomplice, however, as his actions violate the empathy deserving to the policeman.
So there we have two tests appearing. Does the action violate empathy in the individual case? Does the action improve or damage empathy overall? In theory, violations of empathy in the specific case might be justified by the overall good done to empathy. This could potentially be used as an excuse for assassinating tyrants like Hitler for the common good (although it moght well be argued that the punishment was proportionate to the crime in line with empathy). It might also be used to allow for the killing of an innocent (for example where a terrorist threatens the lives of many if the life is not taken). However, if this line is to be taken, then it should only be employed with reluctance, as we ignore the individual at our peril.
Beyond the question of how far empathy should go, two types of empathy should be distinguished here. They are what I shall call transplantative and appreciative empathy. Transplantative empathy is where one imagines oneself in the other's position. This seems to be the best understanding of the saying "Put yourself in their shoes". It is the easier type of empathy, requiring just the imagination to imagine your own situation being different. When one says "There but for the grace of God go I..." one means that one could easily have been in that situation oneself, an example of transplantative empathy.
Appreciative empathy is where, rather than imagining oneself in the other's position, one imagines oneself as the other person. This involves imagining being a different self, and is thus more difficult. It means accepting different characteristics as equally valid. It is argued that this is the better type of empathy. Transplantative empathy alone is not sufficient in many cases. Purely transplantative empathy would deny even physical differences. This is clearly ridiculous when it comes to, for example, appreciating problems that only the opposite gender face.
Furthermore, on racial issues transplantative empathy would certainly favour equality, but a type of equality where problems arising from differences are ignored rather than helped. Particularly in the USA there is an argument over 'affirmative action', positive discrimination in favour of minorites. Transplantative empathy would give everyone an equal chance, in not placing barriers in the way of others, treating them just as if one was "in their shoes". However, it takes appreciative empathy to understand that there are still problems of discrimination from the less enlightened, which mean that sometimes it is necessary to give minorities an advantage to even out the disadvantage. It is this appreciation of problems which we would not face even if "in the other's shoes" which is the root of appreciative empathy. It is superior because it is more realistic, and serves the base purpose of empathy better: Most of us would prefer empathy based on how the situation is to us, rather than how it would be to the one empathising. Appreciative empathy merely means recognising this preference in others.
It is hoped that this has given an insight into my reasons for using empathy as the basis of my moral system, and the type of empathy I mean: Appreciative empathy which extends as far as actions which do not themselves violate empathy.
What is empathy?
As a base description, empathy is the ability to see things from another point of view, and act with consideration of the needs and desires of others rather than just one's own.
Why empathy?
On its face, this question is ridiculous. If, as argued before, the basis of one's system cannot further be justified without going down to further base facts, how can I attempt to explain my reliance on empathy? Well, my reasoning is this: Although I cannot absolutely show why empathy is my basis, I can give partial explanations. None of these is enough as a block to support empathy. However, together they might at least give a way of defending empathy from other systems seeking to claim dominance. If one wishes to see these as 'mini-blocks' holding up empathy, they are free to do so!
The first answer to "Why empathy?" is that it is a key feature of most moral theories. Most religions include in their ethical codes something along the lines of what is, for example, expressed in the Christian tradition as "Do unto others what you would have them do unto you". Of course this key command predates Christianity and indeed, all modern religions. It manifested in pagan systems. In fact, my problems with religion generally manifest when their ethical codes deviate from this command. For example, for many Christians it is subservient to the obligation to obey God. As far as non-religious ethical systems go, Utilitarianism and Kant's writings also give examples of sytems focussing on harm caused. The best way to assess harm seems to be through empathy.
However, I would argue that the case for empathy goes much deeper. A second reason to use it as a basis seems to me more pertinent. Many of us like to believe that we are different from animals in some way, separate and above them. Personally, I do not have much time for such beliefs, as I see them used to excuse ourselves of fearing behaving like savages. We are part of the animal kingdom, but I can well understand the desire to separate ourselves from the rawest part of nature, survival of the fittest. I see in empathy the only instinct we have to look beyond the purely selfish and consider the well-being of others. As such, it is our way of moving beyond the unforgiving part of nature. This is better for most of us, as many would not survive in our natural state. Even without resorting to empathy for the plight of others, empathy makes sense from a purely selfish (enlightened self-interest) point of view.
On a connected note, empathy is what allows society to function. Without it all would attempt to meet their own needs and people could not draw together to provide the safety net for the less fortunate. I do not argue that society is always a positive thing, but for the majority whose lives it has enriched should see this as a point in favour of empathy.
An important stage in the development of children is them learning to see things from the point of view of others. As they learn and agree to compromise, we consider them as maturing. Most things done in childhood, now considered unconscionable, were in large part due to a lack of empathy. Through the idea of 'maturing' we show how it is instinctive that empathy is a laudable quality.
How far should empathy go?
This is a complicated question. Most would agree that it is good to consider the opinions of others, but many would say that they must come second to moral rules. For example, this would be used as an argument for banning euthanasia, as the moral rule to not kill would override the wishes of the person to be killed. Since the argument here is that empathy must be the basis for moral rules, these limits need to be clarified. If morality allows too much acceptance of other people's desires, it would be unable to condemn them for anything.
The answer here is not too difficult, however. If empathy is the foundation, then empathy should only go as far as actions which do not themselves violate empathy. The reason that empathy would not generally be used to argue against punishing people for crimes is that to do so would aid crime itself, which is (at least in the conception to be argued later) a violation of empathy. Therefore, as long as the punishment does not outweigh the violation so as to itself violate empathy, it is compatible with this ethical system.
This can of course get rather complicated. Let us take an example where a policeman catches and arrests a burglar in the act. However, the burglar's accomplice sees this and attacks the policeman. How should this be assessed? The burglar's act was a clear violation of empathy for the property owner. Thus empathy is not necessary for his actions. The policeman clearly violated his wishes by arresting him, but this is not a violation of empathy as he, like us, need not have empathy for the burglar's activities. Furthermore, the policeman's actions further empathy overall, by encouraging empathy for people's property rights. We empathise with the policemans's actions. We do not empathise with the accomplice, however, as his actions violate the empathy deserving to the policeman.
So there we have two tests appearing. Does the action violate empathy in the individual case? Does the action improve or damage empathy overall? In theory, violations of empathy in the specific case might be justified by the overall good done to empathy. This could potentially be used as an excuse for assassinating tyrants like Hitler for the common good (although it moght well be argued that the punishment was proportionate to the crime in line with empathy). It might also be used to allow for the killing of an innocent (for example where a terrorist threatens the lives of many if the life is not taken). However, if this line is to be taken, then it should only be employed with reluctance, as we ignore the individual at our peril.
Beyond the question of how far empathy should go, two types of empathy should be distinguished here. They are what I shall call transplantative and appreciative empathy. Transplantative empathy is where one imagines oneself in the other's position. This seems to be the best understanding of the saying "Put yourself in their shoes". It is the easier type of empathy, requiring just the imagination to imagine your own situation being different. When one says "There but for the grace of God go I..." one means that one could easily have been in that situation oneself, an example of transplantative empathy.
Appreciative empathy is where, rather than imagining oneself in the other's position, one imagines oneself as the other person. This involves imagining being a different self, and is thus more difficult. It means accepting different characteristics as equally valid. It is argued that this is the better type of empathy. Transplantative empathy alone is not sufficient in many cases. Purely transplantative empathy would deny even physical differences. This is clearly ridiculous when it comes to, for example, appreciating problems that only the opposite gender face.
Furthermore, on racial issues transplantative empathy would certainly favour equality, but a type of equality where problems arising from differences are ignored rather than helped. Particularly in the USA there is an argument over 'affirmative action', positive discrimination in favour of minorites. Transplantative empathy would give everyone an equal chance, in not placing barriers in the way of others, treating them just as if one was "in their shoes". However, it takes appreciative empathy to understand that there are still problems of discrimination from the less enlightened, which mean that sometimes it is necessary to give minorities an advantage to even out the disadvantage. It is this appreciation of problems which we would not face even if "in the other's shoes" which is the root of appreciative empathy. It is superior because it is more realistic, and serves the base purpose of empathy better: Most of us would prefer empathy based on how the situation is to us, rather than how it would be to the one empathising. Appreciative empathy merely means recognising this preference in others.
It is hoped that this has given an insight into my reasons for using empathy as the basis of my moral system, and the type of empathy I mean: Appreciative empathy which extends as far as actions which do not themselves violate empathy.
Good News
A couple of pieces of good news today:
I found out that Publius has started blogging again, and judging from his posts so far, he is on fine form.
On a more personal note, I got the results back for my Law Moderations (first year exams at Oxford) and I got a Distinction, the highest grade I can get for them. Needless to say I am pleased! I know I said this wasn't a personal blog, but this news was relevant enough to the topics covered to justify the exception!
I found out that Publius has started blogging again, and judging from his posts so far, he is on fine form.
On a more personal note, I got the results back for my Law Moderations (first year exams at Oxford) and I got a Distinction, the highest grade I can get for them. Needless to say I am pleased! I know I said this wasn't a personal blog, but this news was relevant enough to the topics covered to justify the exception!
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